




INDEPENDENT
TRANSPORT
SAFETY AND
RELIABILITY
REGULATOR

safe and reliable transport services for new south wales



IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NSW GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE to the Final Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Waterfall Accident

Reporting Period: April - June 2006



ITSRR Quarterly Report Six

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to the Final Report of the Special Commission
of Inquiry into the Waterfall Accident

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INDEPENDENT
TRANSPORT
SAFETY AND
RELIABILITY
REGULATOR

31 July 2006

The Hon John Watkins MP
Deputy Premier and Minister for Transport
Level 30, Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place
Sydney NSW 2000

Dear Minister

I am pleased to provide the sixth Quarterly Report on the implementation of the Government's response to the recommendations contained within the Final Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry (SCOI) into the Waterfall Accident. -

As with previous Reports, this Report is provided one month after the completion of the quarter and reflects implementation progress from 1 April 2006 to 30 June 2006. The next report will reflect the progress made in the quarter 1 July 2006 to 30 September 2006.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in purple ink that reads "Natalie Pelham".

Natalie Pelham
A/Chief Executive

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GRAPHS.....	4
TABLES.....	4
ABBREVIATIONS.....	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	6
IMPLEMENTATION SUMMARY.....	6
QUARTERLY PROGRESS.....	8
RECOMMENDATIONS VERIFIED AND CLOSED.....	8
RECOMMENDATIONS CLAIMED FOR CLOSURE (AND BEING VERIFIED).....	10
SLIPPAGE.....	11
METHODOLOGY.....	13
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.....	13
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM FOR RECOMMENDATIONS.....	13
SLIPPAGE.....	14
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS.....	15
EMERGENCY RESPONSE.....	16
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 1-28</i>	16
DESIGN AND PROCUREMENT OF ROLLINGSTOCK.....	18
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 29 & 30</i>	18
DRIVER SAFETY SYSTEMS.....	18
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 31-33</i>	18
RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK CONTROL PROCEDURES.....	19
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 34</i>	19
DATA LOGGERS.....	19
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 36 and 37</i>	19
COMMUNICATIONS.....	19
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 38- 46</i>	19
TRAIN MAINTENANCE.....	20
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 47-53</i>	20
ALCOHOL AND DRUG TESTING.....	20
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 54-56</i>	20
PERIODIC MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS.....	21
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 57(a)-(j)</i>	21
SAFETY DOCUMENT CONTROL.....	22
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 58-64</i>	22
TRAIN DRIVER AND GUARD TRAINING.....	23
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 65 - 71</i>	23
RAIL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION.....	24
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 72 - 82</i>	24
SAFETY CULTURE.....	24
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 83 - 84</i>	24
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY.....	24
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 85- 87</i>	24
PASSENGER SAFETY.....	25
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 88-101</i>	25
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.....	25
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 102- 109</i>	25
SAFETY REFORM.....	26

<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendation 110(a)-(e)</i>	26
SAFETY REGULATION	27
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 111-120</i>	27
INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT	27
<i>SCOI Final Report Recommendations 121- 124</i>	27
SUMMARY	28
APPENDIX 1 – TABLES AND GRAPHS.....	29
APPENDIX 2 – METHODOLOGY	33
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN	33
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM FOR RECOMMENDATIONS	33
RAILCORP & OTHER RAIL OPERATORS.....	36
ITSRR	37
OTHER AGENCIES.....	37
APPENDIX 3 – IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATIONS.....	38

GRAPHS

GRAPH 1: PROGRESSIVE STATUS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS BY QUARTER.....8 & 14

GRAPH 2: CURRENT STATUS OF AGGREGATE RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS AS AT 30 JUNE 2006.....30

TABLES

TABLE 1: RECOMMENDATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY.....28

TABLE 2: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS AS AT 30 JUNE 2006.....29

TABLE 3: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THEME AS AT 30 JUNE 2006.....31

TABLE 4: TAXONOMY FOR CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.....37

ABBREVIATIONS

ALARP	As Low As Reasonably Practicable
ARA	Australasian Railway Association
ATP	Automatic Train Protection
ARTC	Australian Rail Track Corporation
CMC	Code Management Company
CRM	Crew Resource Management
D&A	Drug and Alcohol
ESA	Emergency Service Agencies
ITSRR	Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NROD	National Rail Occurrence Database
NRSAP	National Rail Safety Accreditation Package (also known as NAP or National Accreditation Package)
NTC	National Transport Commission
OH&S	Occupational Health and Safety
OTSI	Office of Transport Safety Investigation
PN	Pacific National Pty Ltd
RIC	Rail Infrastructure Corporation
RC	RailCorp
RMC	Rail Management Centre
RLAP	Rail Legislation Advisory Panel
RSRP	Rail Safety Regulators Panel
RSW	Rail Safety Workers
SCOI	Special Commission of Inquiry
SMS	Safety Management Systems
SMSEP	Safety Management Systems Expert Panel
TACE	Transport Agencies Chief Executives

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Special Commission of Inquiry (SCOI) into the Waterfall Rail Accident released its Final Report on 17 January 2005. In accordance with the Commission's recommendations, the NSW Government agreed that the Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator (ITSRR) should report quarterly on implementation progress. This is the sixth Quarterly Report. It outlines progress made between 1 April 2006 and 30 June 2006.

Implementation Summary

Substantial implementation progress was made during the quarter with significant numbers of recommendations nominated for closure by agencies or verified and closed by ITSRR:

- ITSRR validated and closed out 22 (12%) recommendations (17 RailCorp, 1 RailCorp and NSW Emergency Services and 4 ITSRR) in the following areas:
 - Establishment of a training centre for emergency services personnel;
 - Introduction of training for drivers and guards to promote teamwork and discourage authority gradients;
 - Implementation of an integrated safety management system with the management of Occupational Health and Safety for RailCorp; and
 - Development of new regulations and guidelines to require mandatory drug and alcohol (D&A) testing following certain accidents and/or incidents.

- The 5 (3%) recommendations including 4 sub-elements (detailed on page 10) that slipped do not pose an immediate concern. These recommendations focus on the following areas:
 - training provided to train guards in the use of the MetroNet radio in an emergency; and

- establishment of a formal performance management system incorporating safety accountabilities for managerial positions;
- establishment of criteria for recruitment and promotion of management staff; and
- development of Key Performance Indicator's for management positions.

At the end of the reporting period, the cumulative implementation progress to date for all 177 recommendations (including 127 recommendations and 50 sub-elements) was as follows:


- 132 (75%) recommendations verified and closed¹;
- A further 20 recommendations (11%) were claimed for closure by agencies and are currently being verified by ITSRR;
- A further 6 (3%) recommendations are due for completion by the end of 2006;
- 1 (1%) recommendation (the introduction of national communications technical standards) will be implemented by 2010; and
- 18 (10%) recommendations referred to the National Transport Commission (NTC) have revised implementation timeframes based on advice from the NTC.

This brings the total number of recommendations currently closed or claimed by agencies to be closed (and being verified by ITSRR) to 152 or 86% of all recommendations.

¹ including 5 that were rejected by the NSW Government and 1 which is no longer applicable

The current status of all of the safety actions, compared to their status in the previous quarters, is summarised below:

GRAPH 1: PROGRESSIVE STATUS ALL RECOMMENDATIONS BY QUARTER



As time progresses, it is expected that the peak will shift along the x-axis until all recommendations are closed.

Quarterly Progress

Recommendations Verified and Closed

In the reporting period, ITSRR verified and closed 22 recommendations and sub-elements. Seventeen of these were the responsibility of RailCorp. They included:

- Implementation of rail emergency management procedures including removal of power to the overhead 1500 volt power supply together with procedures to stop oncoming trains to ensure the safety of passengers, crew, nearby members of the public and emergency services personnel at accident sites (Recommendations 6 & 25);
- Implementation of a maintenance plan ensuring that processes are in place for reporting and responding to signal telephone faults (Recommendation 8);

- Implementation of an overall training development program for safety critical employees based on competences identified in Glenbrook Recommendations 1-7 (Recommendation 65);
- Implementation of interactive simulator training for guards and drivers in circumstances such as passing signals at stop or trespassers in the rail corridor (Recommendation 66 & 67);
- Implementation of training for drivers and guards to encourage teamwork and discourage authority gradients (Recommendation 68);
- Implementation of an integrated safety management system (SMS) which includes management of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) (Recommendation 85 & 86);
- Implementation of training of relevant personnel in the location and operation of external emergency door release (EDR) mechanisms on passenger trains (Recommendation 96);
- Implementation of safety action plans for issues arising from external audits (Recommendation 109); and
- Establishment of an integrated SMS including a system for managing audit and investigation findings and analysis of safety data information. Additionally communications protocols and standard phraseology have been implemented (Recommendation 122 (c), (d), (f) parts (vi), (ix), (x) and (xi)).

The 4 ITSRR recommendations closed included:

- Introduction of the National Accreditation Package (NAP) for rail operators which sets out the requirements of a rail operators SMS. This package includes procedures for the design, manufacture, testing and

commissioning of rollingstock as key elements of an operator's SMS (Recommendation 29);

- Introduction of new regulations and guidelines to require mandatory drug and alcohol (D&A) testing following certain accidents and/or incidents (Recommendation 55);
- Accepted advice from the NTC that appropriate follow-up examinations for safety critical employees are provided for in the National Standard for Health Assessment (Recommendation 57 (e)), and
- Accepted advice from the NTC that the National Standard for Health Assessment enables appropriate monitoring of trends in employees' health (Recommendation 57 (f)).

The one RailCorp and NSW Emergency Services recommendation closed included:

- Establishment of a training centre for emergency services personnel (Recommendation 28).

Recommendations Claimed for Closure (and being verified)

During the reporting period, a further 4 recommendations were claimed for closure. The 3 RailCorp recommendations claimed for closure included:

- Training of all operational rail staff in action check lists which outline the steps to follow in an emergency (Recommendation 20);
- Provision of access to electronic versions of safety documentation for RailCorp's operational staff (Recommendation 61); and
- Completion of a task analysis and training needs analysis for RailCorp employees (Recommendation 69).

The RailCorp & NSW Emergency Services recommendation claimed for closure included:

- Provision of access keys and maps identifying all access gates to RailCorp's tracks to Emergency Services (Recommendation 9).

Slippage

During the reporting period, 5 recommendations including 4 sub-elements were not implemented by their scheduled target dates. In ITSRR's view, these recommendations do not pose immediate or significant safety risks to the NSW traveling public. The slippages in timeframes are now scheduled for completion by the end of December 2006. The recommendations that slipped are in the following areas:

- Training provided to guards in the use of MetroNet radio in an emergency. Field activities conducted by ITSRR indicated that further training in this area is required. RailCorp has undertaken to provide revised training which is scheduled to begin at the end of August 2006. ITSRR will commence verification of this training in November 2006 which will allow sufficient time for the roll-out and progression of the training (a slippage of six months) (Recommendation 5);
- Recommendation 122 required RailCorp to develop an integrated safety management system (SMS) which included 17 sub-elements. Thirteen of these have been incorporated into RailCorp's SMS. The 4 sub-elements not yet implemented require RailCorp to:
 - establish a performance management system incorporating safety accountabilities for managerial positions;
 - establish criteria for recruitment and promotion of management staff; and
 - develop key performance indicators for management positions.

In RailCorp's original claim for closure of Recommendation 122, it submitted a program referred to as the "Performance & Development Process". During verification ITSRR was not satisfied that this program adequately addressed the 4 sub-elements listed above. Consequently ITSRR has requested RailCorp to re-submit its claim for closure with a revised implementation plan and timeframe (Recommendation 122 (a), (b), (e) & (f) part (viii)).

METHODOLOGY

This section briefly outlines the processes which ITSRR has instituted to develop and monitor the Implementation Plan for the Government's response to the SCOI Final Report into the Waterfall Rail Accident. Full details of these methods may be found in Appendix 2.

Implementation Plan

ITSRR has reviewed the SCOI Final Report and determined the actions required to implement each recommendation (in line with the Government's response) and which company or agency has responsibility for that action. These expectations formed the basis for determining whether the response put forward by a company or agency is appropriate to meet the recommendation and/or satisfy the safety objective of the recommendation.

Responsible agencies have assigned indicative timeframes for each safety action and ITSRR has reviewed the appropriateness of them to ensure the timeframes are feasible and that processes are in place to adequately monitor progress as well as to give sufficient notice and justification to ITSRR for any changes to the implementation plan. Timeframes agreed with responsible companies or agencies have, to the greatest extent possible, been made realistic and achievable. Details of the Implementation Plan and progress against it may be found in Appendix 3.

Classification System for Recommendations

In order to provide a graduated view of progress against the Implementation Plan, ITSRR has developed a classification system to indicate the relative status of each recommendation. The taxonomy for the Classification System has been drawn from accepted international practice. Appendix 1 includes tables and graphs of the current implementation status of recommendations.

Slippage

In reporting slippage against the agreed timeframes in the Implementation Plan, ITSRR uses the following guide:

- If a claim for closure was expected by the conclusion of the reporting quarter but was not received then it is recorded as slippage;
- If a claim for closure is submitted to ITSRR by the end of the reporting quarter but the target date was earlier in the quarter, it will not be recorded as slippage; and
- If a revised target date for implementation was received from an agency but action will be completed within the original reporting quarter then it is not recorded as slippage. However in the event that the revised target date is not met, ITSRR will record the event as a slippage.


SUMMARY OF PROGRESS

The SCOI was given the task of identifying the causes of the Waterfall accident and ways of preventing such accidents in the future. The Commission was also asked to examine what might lead to overall improvements in the safety management of rail operations in NSW. The SCOI Final Report grouped recommendations under 19 safety themes. These relate to both the causes of the accident and to suggested improvements in the overall management of safety on the NSW rail network.

In this Report, implementation progress is summarised against these 19 safety themes. It outlines progress in the reporting quarter, any slippage against agreed timeframes and any action taken by the responsible agency and/or ITSRR to address slippage. This approach provides the necessary transparency to ensure appropriate public scrutiny of progress made in implementing the Government's response to the SCOI Final Report.

The graph below illustrates the status of recommendations as at 30 June 2006. As time progresses it is expected that the peak will shift along the x-axis until all recommendations are closed.

GRAPH 1: PROGRESSIVE STATUS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS BY QUARTER



Emergency Response

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 1-28

These recommendations relate to the Commission's findings that emergency response procedures to the Waterfall Rail Accident were inadequate. They are intended to ensure that (in the event of a future rail accident) RailCorp has effective procedures in place that will enable it to locate the accident site, secure and isolate it, ensure safety at the site and facilitate access of emergency services. The recommendations also aim to ensure that any such emergency response is coordinated between relevant parties and is timely. These recommendations require the provision of supporting emergency procedures and appropriate training in those procedures.

In the reporting period the following recommendations were closed and verified:

- To ensure the electrical power supply to the area of an accident can be immediately isolated RailCorp have included procedures within their Incident Management Framework (IMF) for communicating rescue power outages to emergency services personnel. Included in these procedures is the allocation of the responsibility to the Rail Commander as the person for obtaining information on the status of the overhead electrical supply. RailCorp also issued a SAFE Notice 2005 No. 008 – *Removing 1500V Supply in Unplanned Situations* – NPR 714 (“the safety notice”) to all relevant operational staff on 15 December 2005. The safety notice provides uniform terminology to be used by all railway and emergency response personnel when removing power supply at the site of an accident (Recommendations 6 & 25).

- RailCorp has implemented an inspection, fault rectification and maintenance plan for signal telephones. ITSRR verified this by testing a sample of signal telephones in each district. Signal telephones tested at

these locations were in working order. RailCorp have also replaced signal telephones and implemented renewal programs to ensure signal telephones are operational (Recommendation 8).

- On 1 May 2006, the Chairman of the State Rescue Board wrote to ITSRR advising that the NSW Police, Ambulance Service of NSW and the NSW Fire Brigades have utilised RailCorp's facility at Petersham and have endorsed its suitability as a training facility for Sydney Metropolitan emergency services personnel (Recommendation 28).

The following progress was made during the quarter:

- ITSRR continued verification of Recommendation 1. The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that staff working in the Rail Management Centre (RMC) have been trained to enable them to quickly and accurately assess that an emergency has occurred and to obtain accurate and reliable information that can be conveyed to the emergency response personnel so that a timely and effective response can ensue.

RailCorp have provided ITSRR with details of the training course that is conducted for staff working in the RMC. In the next quarter, ITSRR will be meeting with RailCorp to discuss this material and visit the RMC to determine the effectiveness of the training program (Recommendation 1).

- RailCorp also submitted to ITSRR, the Emergency Response Plan (Incident Management Framework) which was developed in consultation with Emergency Services. ITSRR will review this plan and supporting plans in the next quarter. ITSRR acknowledges the considerable progress made in the development of these plans (Recommendations 10 & 18).

Design and Procurement of Rollingstock

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 29 & 30

The Commission recommended that all railway operators should have a quality assurance program in place for the design and construction of rollingstock and that the rail safety regulator should set standards for the design, manufacture, testing and commissioning of rollingstock to ensure that it is fit for purpose.

In the reporting quarter the following recommendation was closed and verified:

- ITSRR requires accredited operators to demonstrate that adequate processes are in place regarding the design, construction and implementation of new rolling stock. Until these processes were established, all NSW accredited operators were required to comply with the “minimum operating standards for rollingstock” (MOSRS) – a set of detailed technical standards – as part of the SMS. With the introduction of the National Accreditation Package (NAP) from 1 July 2006 for commercial operators and 1 January 2007 for Tourist and Heritage operators requirements for quality assurance in the design, construction and implementation of new rolling stock must now be included in an operator’s SMS. ITSRR will continue to work with operators to ensure these new requirements are met. This recommendation can now be closed (Recommendation 29).

Driver Safety Systems

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 31-33

These recommendations are intended to minimise the risk of an accident in the event of train driver incapacitation by requiring the fitting of two independent engineering defences to all trains. In the longer term SCOI recommended the introduction of Automatic Train Protection (ATP). The Government supports this in principle; however, its application on an industry-wide basis needs to be determined. ATP systems are more advanced technologies which can

automatically override a driver if a train is behaving in an unauthorised way in relation to network constraints.

RailCorp is continuing work analysing options for improved Automatic Train Protection (ATP) systems for the NSW network and is due to report to Government on these options in September 2006 (Recommendation 32).

Risk Assessment and Risk Control Procedures

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 34

Recommendation 34 and its sub-elements seek to make the rail network safer by ensuring that RailCorp has in place processes to systematically identify and assess risks on the network and put appropriate control measures in place to reduce or eliminate circumstances which might result in an accident. This recommendation and its sub-elements have been verified and closed in previous quarters.

Data Loggers

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 36 and 37

Effective use of data loggers can provide investigators with information to help them in the conduct of any accident or incident investigation to understand the causes of accidents or incidents on the rail network. Data loggers can also assist rail operators monitor driver performance and train operations. Data loggers record information on a train's operations; including, for example, speed during a journey. As previously reported, the National Transport Commission has agreed to develop a national regulation for data loggers subject to the outcome of an impact assessment. The NTC advises that the impact assessment will be conducted in the fourth quarter of 2006.

Communications

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 38- 46

These recommendations address two important issues. First, that standardised communications protocols should be in use on the NSW rail network so that rail employees use clear and well understood language when communicating with each other. This is particularly important in emergency

situations. Second, the compatibility and inter-operability of communications equipment (radios for example), so that in an emergency drivers, signalers, train controllers and other relevant personnel (with different types of communications equipment) are able to talk to each other.

As reported last quarter, the National Transport Commission has agreed to develop a national regulation for communication systems/protocols subject to the outcome of an impact assessment. The NTC advises that the impact assessment will be conducted in the fourth quarter of 2006.

Train Maintenance

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 47-53

The purpose of these recommendations is to ensure there are minimum standards and inspections in place for RailCorp trains entering service and adequate maintenance plans and systems in place to record and rectify train defects, as well as certification of work by an appropriately qualified individual.

During the quarter ITSRR met with RailCorp to progress the closure of Recommendation 53 to ensure that trains are inspected at the time of stabling prior to entering into service. RailCorp have proposed an action plan to meet the intent of this recommendation which will include an internal audit program. This additional information will be submitted next quarter which will enable ITSRR to continue further verification.

Alcohol and Drug Testing

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 54-56

These recommendations are intended to ensure random drug and alcohol (D&A) testing continue and that testing is made mandatory following an incident. The *Rail Safety Act 2002* and supporting D&A testing regulations and guidelines require accredited operators to have a D&A program in place. They also enable operators to conduct post-incident D&A testing, but do not explicitly require post-incident testing.

During the reporting period, new regulations and guidelines that require mandatory D&A testing following certain accidents and/or incidents were developed and approved by the Minister for Transport. The new regulations and guidelines will commence on gazettal. This recommendation has therefore been closed as “acceptable alternative response” on the basis that railway employees will be tested if they have been involved in an incident prescribed by the new regulations (Recommendation 55).

Periodic Medical Examinations

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 57(a)-(j)

This recommendation is directed at minimising the risk of incapacitation of a train driver through more stringent standards for periodic medical examinations for railway safety critical workers. The majority of safety actions required for this recommendation have been implemented, verified and closed through the adoption of the National Standard for Health Assessment of Rail Safety Workers.

Recommendations 57 (d), (e) and (f) were referred to the National Transport Commission (NTC) for review through the maintenance process for the National Standard for Health Assessment for Rail Safety Workers. The recommendations were considered by the NTC’s Medical Advisory Group (MAG) and the maintenance group for the National Standard.

The NTC recommended against the review of all medical examinations on behalf of the employer by an occupational physician but supported the adoption of quality control measures suitable for the size and nature of the rail organisation. The NTC has agreed to commence work on options for quality control measures during the 2006/07 financial year. These options will be subject to an impact assessment which the NTC will undertake and release in mid-2007. A revised closure date of 30 June 2007 has been set to reflect the release of the impact assessment report (Recommendation 57(d)).

During the reporting quarter ITSRR verified and closed:

- Recommendation 57 (e) as an acceptable response based on advice from the NTC that this recommendation was implemented when the National Standard for Health Assessment was adopted since it requires high level safety critical workers (i.e. Category 1) to undertake appropriate follow-up medical examinations; and
- Recommendation 57 (f) as an “alternative acceptable response” based on advice from the NTC that the system provided by the National Standard for Health Assessment enables appropriate monitoring of trends in individual workers’ health and there is no evidence that involvement of an occupational health physician to undertake a separate review would add further value in terms of improved safety.

Safety Document Control

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 58-64

Effective document control, particularly document control of safety information, is a critical element of a rail operator’s safety management system. Employers and employees must be confident that the safety information they are operating under is current and accurate.

During the reporting quarter ITSRR continued to verify Recommendations 58 & 59. Two meetings were held to discuss documentation provided by RailCorp describing the means by which electronic versions of safety documentation is circulated to different groups of operational staff at their place of work. During next quarter ITSSR will continue verification of these two recommendations by assessing that processes are in place for the distribution and updating of safety documents contained in their safety document management system (Recommendation 58 and 59).

Next quarter, verification of Recommendation 61 will be conducted which relates to the provision of access to electronic versions of safety documentation for all operational staff at their workplace.

Train Driver and Guard Training

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 65 - 71

It is important that train drivers and train guards are adequately trained in the performance of their duties. This issue was also raised by the SCOI into the Glenbrook accident. Of particular interest for training is the appropriate use of simulators, encouragement of teamwork, and the development of training based on a needs analysis.

During the reporting period ITSRR conducted field verification and confirmed that RailCorp has implemented the following:

- A training and development program based on competencies including the use of psychometric tests in recruitment processes to satisfy Recommendations 1-7 arising from the Glenbrook Inquiry (Recommendation 65);
- Interactive use of the simulator for drivers and guards to develop response skills in emergency situations and degraded environments (Recommendation 66 & 67); and
- Training programs for drivers and guards to promote teamwork and discourage authority gradients (Recommendation 68).

As a result, the above actions satisfy the intent of these recommendations which have subsequently been closed. During the next reporting period ITSRR will commence verification of Recommendation 69 which concerns the completion of a task analysis and training needs analysis for RailCorp employees. (Recommendation 69).

Rail Accident Investigation

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 72 - 82

The SCOI Final Report promulgated “just culture” investigations (ie, those aimed at determining all the factors contributing to an accident, including systemic factors rather than attempting to allocate blame or liability), as more likely to contribute to improved safety outcomes in the longer term. Recommendations 72 -74 and 82 concern the powers of, and relationship between, the NSW Office of Transport Safety Investigations (OTSI) and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). All of these recommendations have been verified and closed.

Safety Culture

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 83 - 84

It is accepted safety practice that a positive safety culture works in tandem with a safety management system to deliver safe operations. The safety culture recommendations require a plan from RailCorp and a subsequent review by ITSRR. All of these recommendations have been verified and closed.

Occupational Health and Safety

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 85- 87

Recommendations 85-87 articulated the SCOI’s concern that RailCorp’s approach to safety management was overly focused on occupational health and safety (OHS). By this it meant that RailCorp primarily sought to implement risk control measures for risks of relatively low consequence, but high frequency, to the detriment of more significant risks of relatively high consequence, but low frequency. The SCOI recommended integration of OHS management into RailCorp’s overall safety management system, so that broader public safety concerns, such as derailments or collisions, would receive greater attention.

Recommendations 85 and 86 were verified and closed during the reporting period. Through field activities, ITSRR confirmed that RailCorp has

implemented an integrated safety management system (SMS) which includes the management of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) (Recommendation 85 & 86).

Passenger Safety

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 88-101

These recommendations address emergency egress and access (ie, ways in which passengers can escape from trains in an emergency and the way emergency services and other rescuers can get into trains), emergency evacuation procedures and associated training and standards, as well as the adequacy of penalties for misuse of emergency and other safety related equipment.

In the reporting period ITSRR closed Recommendation 96. Through field inspections ITSRR verified that station staff receive appropriate training in the location and operation of external emergency door release mechanisms.

Corporate Governance

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 102- 109

These recommendations introduce requirements for formal qualifications in system safety management for managers who report to the CEO of RailCorp. They also require development of safety accountability statements and reporting lines for all management positions and the introduction of independent external and internal audit processes to be managed by the RailCorp Board.

During the quarter ITSRR verified and closed Recommendation 109. ITSRR verified that RailCorp has implemented “Safety Action Management” procedures to ensure that findings from external audits, external accident and incident investigations and internal investigations are properly managed (Recommendation 109).

The following progress was made during the quarter:

- RailCorp has made progress on Recommendation 103 which requires RailCorp to establish clear safety accountability statements and reporting lines for all management positions. RailCorp has developed a new system of accountability and performance management. This is different to the actions contained in the Government's response to the Final Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Waterfall Accident. As a result, ITSRR is continuing to review whether the new arrangements are equivalent. Closure of this recommendation is dependent on the closure of the outstanding sub-elements (4) of Recommendation 122 which requires RailCorp to implement a performance management process (Recommendation 103).
- ITSRR has continued to verify Recommendation 105 which requires RailCorp's Board to ensure that the organisation has an adequate and integrated SMS, including systems for risk assessment and clearly defined safety responsibilities and accountabilities for managerial positions and specific performance criteria. Closure of this recommendation is dependent on the closure of the outstanding sub-elements (4) of Recommendation 122 which requires RailCorp to implement a performance management process. Once these requirements have been satisfied RailCorp's Board will then be able to demonstrate how managers are held accountable for safety performance. RailCorp has made progress in this area through the appointment of an independent auditor to provide the Board with advice on the adequacy of the Safety Management System (Recommendation 105).

Safety Reform

SCOI Final Report Recommendation 110(a)-(e)

This recommendation sought to create a position of Safety Reform Program Director to manage the safety reform program being undertaken by RailCorp and detailed various aspects of the duties that should be undertaken by this

position. All of these recommendations have been verified and closed in previous quarters.

Safety Regulation

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 111-120

These recommendations addressed the role of ITSRR in relation to safety regulation, the governance of ITSRR and the need for more explicit guidelines from ITSRR. All of these recommendations have been verified and closed in previous quarters.

Integrated Safety Management

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 121- 124

These recommendations advocated that a regulation be promulgated specifying the requirements of a safety management system (SMS) (Recommendation 121) and the steps RailCorp needs to take to ensure that its SMS is integrated (Recommendation 122 – 124).

The NTC is developing a national regulation specifying requirements of an accredited operator's SMS. The NTC expects to circulate a final regulation for industry wide consultation in July 2006 with a model regulation anticipated for jurisdictions to adopt sometime in early 2007. The national regulation will be based on the National Accreditation Package (NAP). The NAP guidelines, which are mandatory in NSW, came into effect on 1 July 2006 for commercial operators and will commence on 1 January 2007 for tourist and heritage operators (Recommendation 121).

During the reporting period ITSRR closed and verified:

- That RailCorp has established an integrated safety management system involving the development of risk management procedures including:
 - an effective means of reviewing and acting upon audit investigation findings;
 - a system for managing audit and investigation findings;

- systems to monitor the effectiveness of controls;
- safety information data collection and identification of hazards;
- trend analysis, and
- implementation of communications protocols and standard phraseology.
(Recommendation 122 (c), (d) and (f) parts (vi), (ix), (x) & (xi)).

Summary

The public reporting process associated with the Quarterly Reports on the implementation progress of the NSW Government's response sharpens both industry and public focus on rail safety. With 132 (75%) recommendations now closed together with 20 (11%) recommendations claimed for closure this quarter substantial progress has been made since the release of the Report just over 1 year ago.

Rail safety in NSW does not rest with the implementation of these recommendations. Rail Safety is underpinned by comprehensive risk management (through integrated safety management systems) and a continuously improving safety culture in rail operations, both of which were key themes identified by the SCOI in its recommendations. This combined with the move towards nationally consistent rail regulation and improved standards for rail safety effected by both regulators and rail operators, should deliver improved rail safety in NSW.

APPENDIX 1 – TABLES AND GRAPHS

This table lists the recommendations for which each agency is responsible:

TABLE 1: RECOMMENDATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY	RECOMMENDATIONS FROM SCOI FINAL REPORT	NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS
RailCorp	1-8, 10-14, 16-20, 22, 25-27, 32, 34(a) – (h), 40, 47-53, 56, 58-62, 65-71, 83(a)-(n), 85-88, 96, 102-110(a)-(e), 122(a)-(f(i-xii)), 123,	103
Emergency Services Agencies	15, 97	2
Emergency Services Agencies & RailCorp	9, 21, 23, 24, 28	5
ITSRR	29, 30, 31, 33, 36-39, 41-46, 54-55, 57(a)-(i), 63-64, 75-80, 84, 89-95, 98-101, 113-117, 119-121, 124-125(a)-(b), 126	57
OTSI	72, 73, 74, 81, 82	5
Not assigned	35, 111, 112, 118, 127	5
TOTAL	127	177


At the end of the second quarter 2006, the status of the 177 Recommendations including sub-elements of the SCOI Final Report is detailed in the following table:

TABLE 2: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS AS AT 30 JUNE 2006

Operator	Open - Awaiting Response	Open-Response Received	Open - Acceptable Response	Open - Acceptable Alternate Response	Open-Response Rejected	Open - Company Claims Closure	Closed - Recommendation Rejected	Closed - N/A	Closed - Action Verified	Closed - Action Not verified	Total
Not Assigned							5				5
RailCorp			6			19			78		103
Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator			19						38		57
Office of Transport Safety Investigation			0					1	4		5
NSW Emergency Services			0						2		2
RailCorp/ NSW Emergency Services			0			1			4		5
TOTAL	0	0	25	0	0	20	5	1	126	0	177

The graph below illustrates the recommendations according to their respective status.

GRAPH 2: CURRENT STATUS OF AGGREGATE RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS AS AT 30 JUNE 2006.



In the SCOI Final Report recommendations were listed against specific themes or topics relating to the causal factors associated with the Waterfall Rail Accident. The following table presents the status of recommendations by these themes:

TABLE 3: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THEME AS AT 30 JUNE 2006

Theme	Open - Awaiting Response	Open - Response Received	Open - Acceptable Response	Open - Acceptable Alternative Response	Open - Response Rejected by ITSRR	Open - Company Claims Closure	Closed Recommendation Rejected	Closed - No Longer Applicable	Closed Action Verified	Closed - Action Not Verified	Total
Emergency response 1-28	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	21	0	28
Procurement & design of rolling stock 29-30	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Driver safety systems 31-33	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
Risk assessment and control procedures 34-35	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	9
Data loggers 36-37	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Communications 38-46	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	9
Train Maintenance 47-53	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	7
Alcohol and Drug Testing 54-56	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
Periodic Medical Examinations 57	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	9
Safety Document Control 58-64	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	4	0	7
Train Driver and Guard Training 65-71	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	7
Rail Accident Investigation 72-82	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	0	11
Safety Culture 83-84	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	15
OH&S 85-87	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
Passenger safety 88-101	0	0	10	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	14
Corporate Governance 102-109	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	5	0	8
Safety Reform 110	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
Safety Regulation 111-120	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	7	0	10
Integrated Safety Management 121-124	0	0	1	0	0	5	0	0	15	0	21
Implementation of Recommendations 125-127	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	4

APPENDIX 2 – METHODOLOGY

This section outlines the processes which ITSRR has instituted to develop and monitor the Implementation Plan for the Government's response to the SCOI Final Report into the Waterfall Rail Accident.

Implementation Plan

ITSRR has reviewed the SCOI Final Report and determined action required to implement each recommendation in line with the Government's response and which company or agency has responsibility for that action. These expectations then formed the basis for determining whether the response put forward by a company or agency is appropriate to meet the recommendation and/or satisfy the safety objective of the recommendation. Responsible agencies have assigned indicative timeframes for each safety action and ITSRR will review the appropriateness of each. Timeframes agreed with responsible companies or agencies have, to the greatest extent possible, been made realistic and achievable. Details of the Implementation Plan and progress against it may be found in Appendix 3 at page 49.

Classification System for Recommendations

In order to provide a graduated view of progress against the Implementation Plan, ITSRR has developed a classification system to indicate the relative status of each recommendation. The taxonomy for the Classification System has been drawn from accepted international practice and is listed in Table 4 at page 34 below.

The process for assigning status to a recommendation is as follows:

Step 1 The Government's response to the SCOI Final Report determined which recommendations were accepted. ITSRR has articulated its expectations in regards to all remaining recommendations.

- Step 2 All accepted recommendations are assigned the status "Open - Await Response". These recommendations are then referred by ITSRR to the relevant company or agency to prepare a response to the recommendation(s) and submit it to ITSRR.
- Step 3 ITSRR reviews the response and determines whether it is acceptable or not. If it is acceptable then the status of the recommendation is assigned either "Open - Acceptable Response" or "Open - Acceptable Alternative Response". A recommendation would be assigned an "Open - Acceptable Alternative Response" status when the intent of a recommendation will be met but will be implemented by alternative means. If the response is not acceptable then the recommendation is assigned the status of "Open - Response Rejected". In this case, the company or agency is informed of the decision and requested to re-submit a revised response taking into account ITSRR's concerns. This process continues until the response to the recommendation is accepted by ITSRR.
- Step 4 ITSRR monitors progress of all accepted responses to ensure a company or agency is meeting agreed implementation timeframes. This is done through both desktop reviews of reports received by agencies and in-field inspections to verify progress claimed.
- Step 5 Once a company or agency has completed a required action it will submit to ITSRR a claim for closure of the recommendation. This application indicates that the company or agency believes it has completed the required action. The status of the recommendation is changed to "Open – Company Claims Closure".
- Step 6 In most cases, ITSRR will verify closure through an in field compliance inspection or audit. Once verification has taken

place the recommendation status is changed to indicate it is "Closed - Verified".

This process will continue until all recommendations are closed.

TABLE 4: TAXONOMY FOR CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

	STATUS	DEFINITION
1.	Open – Await Response	This status is automatically assigned to an accepted recommendation. Affected parties will be asked to submit their response for implementing the recommendation to ITSRR.
2.	Open – Response Received	ITSRR has received a response from an affected party and this response is under review by ITSRR. It has not yet been accepted by ITSRR.
3.	Open – Acceptable Response	ITSRR agrees that the planned action, when completed, meets the recommendation.
4.	Open – Acceptable Alternative Response	ITSRR agrees that alternative action, when completed, satisfies the objective of the recommendation.
5.	Open – Response Rejected by ITSRR	ITSRR does not agree that the planned or alternate action meets the recommendation. The company or agency is advised of the rejection and requested to provide a revised response.
6.	Open – Company Claims Closure	The company or agency claims that the planned or alternate action has been completed. The action has not yet been verified by ITSRR. ITSRR has not yet agreed that the item is closed.
7.	Closed – Recommendation Rejected	ITSRR has determined through further analysis and review that the recommendation is not appropriate (i.e. will not achieve the desired safety outcomes) and has rejected the recommendation. It is therefore closed.

8.	Closed – No Longer Applicable	The recommendation has been overtaken by events and action is no longer required. For example, a new technology has eliminated the reason for the recommendation, it has been superseded by other recommendations issued, or the operator affected has gone out of business.
9.	Closed – Action Verified	Completion of the planned or alternate action has been verified by ITSRR through a compliance inspection or audit.
10.	Closed – Action Not Verified	ITSRR accepts that the planned or alternate action has been completed following a review of documentation submitted. Field verification is not necessary.

RailCorp & Other Rail Operators

The SCOI Final Report primarily focused on RailCorp and actions required by it to improve safety as a consequence of the Waterfall Rail Accident. In quarterly reports therefore, ITSRR will report on recommendations specific to RailCorp. However, some recommendations from the Final Report may also be relevant to other rail operators in NSW. In light of this, ITSRR has reviewed the recommendations and identified where other rail operators may also be required to improve safety operations.

Where recommendations have applicability to the wider rail industry, ITSRR will report on progress of its own actions to ensure other operators also meet the intent of SCOI recommendations and on any general areas of concern about implementation issues across the industry. Progress on specific safety actions by other rail operators will not be reported upon in ITSRR quarterly reports.

ITSRR

ITSRR is also responsible for implementing recommendations from the SCOI Final Report. These quarterly reports will assess progress made by ITSRR on those recommendations. The same methodology as outlined above will be used to assess the implementation status of recommendations for which ITSRR is responsible. ITSRR has established an internal process between Divisions which allows for an independent assessment of whether recommendations are being implemented according to the Implementation Plan and to ensure status reports accurately reflect progress against the Plan. The Chief Executive must sign off on all completed actions before a recommendation is closed.

Other Agencies

ITSRR has held meetings with the Office of Emergency Services and the Office of Transport Safety Investigation (OTSI) to review and discuss the implementation and reporting of recommendations under their responsibility. Review of responses from these agencies will also follow the process outlined above and will be reported quarterly. ITSRR has agreed to timeframes and actions with each of these agencies.

APPENDIX 3 – IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATIONS

NB: This table lists only the recommendations which were closed in the last quarter, or remain to be implemented. Those recommendations closed in previous quarters do not appear. A complete list of all recommendations is contained in the First Report, on ITSRR's website at: <http://www.transportregulator.nsw.gov.au>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
1. Staff at the Rail Management Centre (RMC) should receive training from RailCorp to enable them to quickly and accurately assess that an emergency has occurred and to provide precise and reliable information to emergency response personnel about the location of the emergency, the available access to the site and the resources necessary.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues identified in the SCOI. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum). b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/03/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>4. The RMC should be equipped by RailCorp with a transcriber system, or mimic board, or such other system as is necessary to enable identification of the precise location at any time of any train on the RailCorp network.</p>	<p>Supported in principle. The RMC is equipped with a network mimic panel that currently gives train visibility on approximately 65% of the RailCorp network. Visibility of approximately 90% is targeted for 2008. RailCorp will conduct a study of other options available, including GPS technology to provide a more precise location at any time of all operators' trains on the RailCorp network.</p>	<p>RailCorp to provide a detailed program to explain how the trains will be located on a board, or similar, in the RMC. Recognising that this will require some Capital expenditure, it is expected that the program will be a funded program with timelines. Functionality is to include a requirement to enable trains to be readily identified, as a minimum. Compliance review (i.e. Current coverage of network, e.g. does it cover 65%.) Review existence planning / funding (i.e. 90% coverage 2008.) Existence of plans / project to review options available.</p>	<p>RailCorp</p>	<p>Open</p>	<p>Agency Claims Closure</p>	<p>31/03/2006</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>5. All train guards should be trained by RailCorp in the use, of the MetroNet radio and instructed to use it in any emergency.</p>	<p>The training of guards in the use of MetroNet radio is supported and being implemented. The use of MetroNet radio by guards in emergencies is supported in principle and RailCorp will review the operational and technical issues the recommendation raises.</p>	<p>RailCorp to provide details of the training program that demonstrates that Guards are trained in the use of MetroNet and know how to use the system in an emergency. The program is to include: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes. e) Ensure guard has access to communications. f) Assess Project Plan for Implementation.</p>	<p>RailCorp</p>	<p>Open</p>	<p>Agency Claims Closure</p>	<p>+31/12/2006</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>6. Procedures should be put in place by RailCorp to ensure that electrical power supply to the area of an accident can be immediately isolated, if necessary, in the event of a rail injury or harm.</p>	<p>Supported and being implemented.</p>	<p>RailCorp to demonstrate that appropriate procedures have been established and that all appropriate staff have been trained in the procedures. The overall program is to demonstrate that procedures have been developed, with appropriate consultation. Project to include: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes. e) Ensure that the procedures are included in Incident Plans.</p>	<p>RailCorp</p>	<p>Closed</p>		<p>31/10/2005</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
8. All signal telephones must be maintained by RailCorp in proper working order.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to demonstrate that a suitable inspection, fault rectification and maintenance plan is in place. The Maintenance Plan is to include: - process for reporting faults. - process for responding to faults. - preventative maintenance.	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
9. All emergency services stations should be provided with access keys to, and maps showing, all gates providing access to RailCorp tracks within their geographic area of responsibility.	Supported in principle subject to discussion between RailCorp and emergency services regarding operational and security issues.	Item requires an agreement between RailCorp and Emergency Services in place on most effective means of access to information to facilitate immediate access to emergency site agreement with emergency services. RailCorp to demonstrate that details are included in the Incident Management Plans.	RailCorp and NSW Emergency Services	Open	Agency Claims Closure	30/06/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>10. A railway disaster plan, or rail displan, should be developed by RailCorp and the emergency services to ensure co-ordinated inter-agency response to rail accidents and incidents on the RailCorp network.</p>	<p>Supported in principle and being implemented through other means. The State Emergency Management Committee advises a specific sub plan for rail would not provide additional response capability and it would not be consistent with the all Hazards approach. Instead the Commissioner's recommendations below about a specific Railway Disaster Plan will be incorporated in the overall State Disaster Plan (Displan) and RailCorp's Incident Management Framework. This Framework addresses all level of rail incidents including 'emergencies' and will be implemented early 2005.</p>	<p>That a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies. The details of the plan are to include, amongst other things: immediate response, site management and recovery processes. Also requires the development of: - Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures. - Development of Network Incident Management plan with ARTC RailCorp (Track Manager). - Training Issues to ensure that staff can implement.</p>	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/07/2006
<p>18. RailCorp should develop and implement an emergency response plan for management of all rail accidents. Such a plan should be subsumed by the rail displan in the case of serious accidents or incidents.</p>	<p>Supported and being implemented through the RailCorp Incident Management Framework. The RailCorp Incident Management Framework was developed in consultation with emergency service agencies and it aligns with the State Disaster Plan</p>	<p>That a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies. The details of the plan are to include, amongst other things: immediate response, site management and recovery processes. Also requires the development of: - Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures. - Development of Network Incident Management plan</p>	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/07/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		with RailCorp (Track Manager). - Training Issues to ensure that staff can implement.				

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
20. All operational rail staff should be trained by RailCorp in the action check list relevant to each.	Supported.	That a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies. The details of the plan are to include, amongst other things: immediate response, site management and recovery processes. Also requires the development of: - Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures.- Development of Network Incident Management plan with RailCorp (Track Manager).- Training Issues to ensure that staff can implement.- Development / Implementation of checklists- Distribution of the checklists and alignment with the staff training and emergency exercises. To ensure that training requirements met under Recommendation 3 namely, RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues (includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum); b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. Delivery of course by	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	30/06/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		<p>appropriately qualified trainers; c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff; d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes; e) Evidence of Training of Skills assessment; f) Evidence of responsibilities in PD; g) Evidence of responsibilities reflected in plan. To ensure that staff can implement emergency procedures in respect of Recommendations: 11 (use by all emergency response personnel of a uniform incident command system); 12 (appointment of a rail emergency management co-ordinator at the RMC, and an on-site rail commander); 13 (Site Controller to have complete control of the site & the Rail Commander must report to this position); 14 (Incident Command System has clearly identified roles and that a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies); 16 (rail commander should provide support and assistance to the</p>				

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		<p>site controller and emergency services personnel); 17 (The rail commander should have complete authority to direct and control all response personnel from rail organisations); 19 (The RailCorp emergency response plan should include action checklists of the steps that each employee is required to take, and the order for specific employees to follow in case of emergency.</p>				

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
25. Uniform verbal descriptions identifying that power has been isolated should be developed by RailCorp and utilised by all railway personnel, electrical service providers and all emergency response personnel.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: Procedures Developed (Including Appropriate Consultation Development.) a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes. e) Ensure included in Incident Management Plans.	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
28. A training centre for emergency services personnel should be established by RailCorp. The emergency services personnel should be required to undertake training at such a centre, which should be equipped with features replicating railway infrastructure and rolling stock.	Supported and being implemented. An emergency services training facility is in place at Redfern with a platform, double decker carriage and blackout facilities. Petersham now nominated in place of Redfern	RailCorp and Emergency Services Agencies to review appropriateness and suitability of existing facilities. determine and implement these arrangements.	RailCorp and NSW Emergency Services	Closed		31/07/2004

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
29. All railway owners and operators should have a quality assurance program for the design and construction of rolling stock and regular review of construction to ensure that the rolling stock satisfies the original functional performance specifications.	Supported and being implemented.	ITSRR will ensure through its accreditation process that operators have detailed procedures for the design, construction and introduction of any new rolling stock.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		30/06/2006
30. The rail safety regulator should set standards for the design, manufacture, testing and commissioning of rolling stock to ensure that the rolling stock is fit for its purpose.	Supported in principle and being implemented through other means. ITSRR will introduce regulations including for rolling stock that set out the expectations (or performance outcomes) required of industry. The regulations will be developed on a national basis, through the National Transport Commission process, to ensure consistent application across the Australian rail industry. Notwithstanding the expectation that industry will develop and maintain appropriate safety standards, ITSRR will retain the power to mandate such standards if the industry clearly fails to deliver satisfactory safety outcomes.	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation. In the interim, ITSRR will require operators, through the accreditation process to meet existing industry standards for rolling stock acquisition, including AS4292, rolling stock units, Train Operating Conditions and Industry technical codes.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>32. RailCorp should progressively implement, within a reasonable time, level 2 automatic train protection with the features identified in chapter 8 of this report.</p>	<p>Requires further detailed review. The Government supports the implementation of additional train protection systems. Implementation of level 2 ATP as detailed in the recommendation would involve the replacement of all line-side signalling on the RailCorp network with on-train control systems. In addition every intra and inter-state train accessing the network would also need to be equipped with level 2 ATP technology. RailCorp has already retained consultants to undertake evaluation and risk assessment regarding implementation of additional automatic train protection systems on the RailCorp network. RailCorp will work with the Australian Rail Track Corporation (which operates the interstate network) to develop, in conjunction with ITSRR and interstate rail regulators, a national standard for an automatic train protection system. RailCorp will also undertake a comprehensive review which will include a risk assessment, technical feasibility and cost benefit analysis of introducing level 1 ATP as well as level 2 ATP, as recommended by the Commission. Consistent with</p>	<p>A detailed technical review of available options. This is to be a project lead by RailCorp. The major outcome of the project is to be a business case for Government concerning ATP.</p>	<p>RailCorp</p>	<p>Open</p>	<p>Acceptable Response</p>	<p>30/09/2006</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	<p>recommendation 34 any future options will need to be assessed by independent verification of acceptable risk.</p>					

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
33. All new rolling stock should be designed to be compatible with at least level 2 automatic train protection discussed in chapter 7 of this report. Risk assessment and risk control procedures.	Requires further detailed review. See R 32.	Recommendation incorporated into review that will be undertaken in response to Recommendation 32. ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for the development of regulation/standards for rolling stock.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006
36. The ITSRR should impose a standard in relation to the collection and use of data from data loggers.	Supported in principle for implementation through other means. ITSRR will introduce regulations including for data loggers that set out the expectations (or performance outcomes) required of industry. The regulations will be developed on a national basis, through the National Transport Commission process, to ensure consistent application across the Australian rail industry. Notwithstanding the expectation that industry will develop and maintain appropriate safety standards, ITSRR will retain the power to mandate such standards if the industry clearly fails to deliver satisfactory safety outcomes.	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation. In the interim, ITSRR will review existing standards set in access agreements to ensure adequate standards for collection and use of data.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
37. The standard in relation to the collection and use of data from data loggers should provide that such information must be accessed in the circumstances of any accident or incident and can be accessed to monitor driver performance generally.	Supported in principle for implementation through other means. (See R 36) Information from data loggers can be accessed to monitor for any incident or accident and can be accessed to monitor a driver's performance generally.	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation ITSRR will adopt National Regulation In the interim, ITSRR will seek from RailCorp proposals to improve the monitoring of driver performance (especially for training purposes)	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006
38. There must be compatibility of communications systems throughout the rail network. It is essential that all train drivers, train controllers, signallers, train guards and supervisors of trackside work gangs in New South Wales be able to communicate using the same technology.	Supported and being implemented. The National Standing Committee of Transport endorsed the Australasian Railway Association working with operators and regulators, including RailCorp and ITSRR, to develop a national approach on communications systems, which has agreed minimum functionality requirements for train radio systems. RailCorp plans to implement a digital train radio system. An objective of this system is for it to be interoperable with existing analogue radio systems. Because of the technical complexities associated with achieving inter-operability, this has been a longer-term initiative and the first stage of its implementation will commence in 2005.	ITSRR to ensure functionality and compatibility requirements included in national standard, currently under development by the Australasian Railway Association. ITSRR to ensure RailCorp/ARTC Radio Functionality for next generation technology compatibility requirements.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	31/12/2010

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
39. Communications procedures must be standardised throughout the rail network, so that all railway employees describe the same subject matter in an identical way.	Supported. RailCorp Network Procedures contain standardised communications procedures, which are in place across the NSW network. ITSRR will introduce regulations including for communications that set out the expectations (or performance outcomes) required of industry. The regulations will be developed on a national basis, through the National Transport Commission process, to ensure consistent application across the Australian rail industry.	ITSRR to ensure that standard communications procedures are included in Network rules. ITSRR to ensure that appropriate Training is provided by operator including: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes. ITSRR will refer matter to the NTC for development of National regulations.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006
43. Communications protocols and procedures should be standardised. and mandated by regulations making them a condition of accreditation.	Supported. As for R 39.	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation ITSRR will adopt National Regulation. In the interim, ITSRR will enforce compliance with the current	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		protocols through its accreditation, audit and compliance activities.				
50. All reported train defects should be certified by a person in a supervisory position in RailCorp as having been rectified.	Supported and being implemented. a supervisory position in RailCorp as having been rectified.	RailCorp to have identified an appropriate position to sign off train defects that have been rectified. RailCorp to have implemented procedures to support and implement process.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	30/09/2006
52. Maintenance plans on all trains should be revised annually.	Supported in principle for further review. All maintenance plans are being reviewed. RailCorp will incorporate this recommendation in that review.	All plans reviewed. Process to ensure regular / appropriate reviews take place	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	31/12/2006
53. Train inspections should be carried out at the time of stabling RailCorp trains, as well as a part of train preparation prior to entering service.	Supported in principle for further review. RailCorp is reviewing procedures and resources to rectify defects. RailCorp provides time for drivers of stabling trains to report any noted defect.	A document risk assessment and/or business case by RailCorp, detailing how train integrity on entering into service is to be managed.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/10/2005
55. Alcohol and drug testing should be mandatory for any train driver or guard involved in any accident or incident.	Supported. ITSRR will review this recommendation as part of its ongoing involvement in checking Drug & Alcohol Programs of rail operators. RailCorp currently tests randomly for drugs and alcohol and allows for drug and alcohol testing to be undertaken for safety-related accidents and incidents.	ITSRR to Develop guideline on when/which accidents/incidents require mandatory testing.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		30/04/2006
57.d) all such medical examinations must be reviewed on behalf of the	Supported. ITSRR will submit this recommendation to the National Transport Commission (NTC) for	ITSRR will submit recommendation to NTC for consideration in context of	Independent Transport Safety &	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/06/2007

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
employer by an occupational physician.	consideration as part of the National Standard.	current standard	Reliability Regulator			
57.e) appropriate follow up examinations, such as a stress ECG or examination by a cardiologist, must be arranged for any safety critical employee whom the occupational physician believes may be at risk of sudden incapacitation	Supported. ITSRR will submit this recommendation to the National Transport Commission for consideration as part of the National Standard.	ITSRR will submit recommendation to NTC for consideration in context of current standard	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		*30/06/2006
57.f) medical histories of employees should be monitored by an occupational physician to enable identification of any trends that may indicate a deteriorating state of health	Supported in principle and being implemented through other means. The standard requires follow-up examinations to be arranged for safety critical workers whom the examining doctor (AHP) believes may be at risk of sudden incapacitation. *Note The Health Assessment Standards refer to an Authorised Health Professional, who is not necessarily an occupational physician but is a doctor who has received the appropriate training.	ITSRR will submit recommendation to NTC for consideration in context of current standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed	Acceptable Alternative Response	*30/06/2006
58. RailCorp should establish a comprehensive safety document management system	Supported.	RailCorp Safety Document Management System to be Implemented which incorporates recommendation 59-62.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/10/2005
59. The safety document management system should provide for the distribution of electronic versions of safety	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp Safety Document Management System provides for the distribution of electronic versions of safety	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/10/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
documentation to relevant staff.		documentation to relevant staff.				
61. RailCorp should provide access to electronic versions of safety documentation for all operational staff at their workplace.	Supported in principle for further review. RailCorp is reviewing options for providing all staff with the best and appropriate means of accessing safety documentation, including by electronic means.	The Rail Safety Document Management System ensures the distribution of electronic versions of safety documentation to relevant staff. Procedures in place so that all operational staff can access safety documentation at appropriate times.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	30/06/2006
65. Recommendations one to seven of the final report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Glenbrook Rail Accident should be fully implemented, save that the random auditing referred to in recommendations five and seven should be carried out by ITSRR	Supported and being implemented. ITSRR and RailCorp will review the implementation of all the seven recommendations in light of the Waterfall Inquiry.	RailCorp to conduct an Audit review of Recommendations 1-7 of Glenbrook report. RailCorp to develop an overall training development program based on competences identified in Glenbrook Recommendations 1-7. This is expected to deal with training related issues identified in recommendations from SCOI/Glenbrook.	RailCorp	Closed		31/07/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
66. RailCorp should use its simulators in an interactive manner.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Closed		30/06/2005
67. RailCorp should use its simulators to train drivers and guards in methods of dealing with degraded operations on the rail network.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues in recommendations 66-70 (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency.(Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d)	RailCorp	Closed		30/06/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.				
68. Train driver and guard training should encourage teamwork and discourage authority gradients.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues in recommendations 66-70 (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency.(Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Closed		31/07/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
69. RailCorp must establish a task analysis for particular categories of employees, to identify the specific skills and responsibility of those employees or groups of employees, and thereafter undertake a training needs analysis; to develop the skills required in particular areas.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues in recommendations 66-70 (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency.(Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	30/06/2006
70. Training should be based upon a needs analysis, to determine what skills a particular person will require to carry out the tasks of any position safely and efficiently, and instruction and practice, to acquire and demonstrate those skills.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide evidence of a corporate system to identify skills development requirements based on a needs analysis.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	31/12/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
71. The position of team leader should be created by RailCorp to be responsible for a group of approximately 30 train drivers, with responsibility to ensure that each train driver's training needs are being met and that any safety concerns of train drivers are being properly addressed. The team leaders are to have direct access to the Chief Executive of RailCorp if any safety concerns they have are not addressed	Supported in principle for further review. RailCorp is reviewing the current supervisory structure of train crewing in light of this recommendation.	Creation of appropriate position to carry out functions outlined in Rec 71.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	30/09/2006
85. RailCorp's approach to occupational health and safety should be proactive and involve the systematic analysis of all current hazards, risks and controls and an assessment of their adequacy to reduce the risk of injury to, or death of, employees to an acceptable level overall safety management	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to demonstrate the implementation of an integrated SMS as detailed in their accreditation application.	RailCorp	Closed		30/06/2005
86. RailCorp should integrate its management of OHS into its overall safety management	Supported and being implemented.	Requirements to be part of SMS.	RailCorp	Closed		30/06/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
88. The RailCorp passenger containment policy must be abandoned	Supported. RailCorp will review and replace the current containment policy, in consultation with ITSRR. The Commission recognised the complexity of determining appropriate policy and operational/technical arrangements for emergency egress from trains. Evidence to the Commission was that on some occasions passengers are best kept inside a train; in others they need to be able to escape. An independent risk assessment of the alternatives to the current policy will be undertaken. This risk assessment will be consistent with recommendation 34, and the replacement passenger containment policy will be based on its results.	Risk Assessment conducted. Containment Policy reviewed. New Policy developed and implemented.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/03/2006
89. There must be a minimum of two independent methods of self-initiated emergency escape for passengers from all trains at all times.	Requires further detailed review, subject to the risk assessment referred to in R88.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
90. All passenger trains must be fitted with an internal passenger emergency door release.	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006
91. All passenger trains operating in New South Wales must be fitted with external emergency door releases which do not require any special key or other equipment to operate.	Supported and being implemented. RailCorp has commenced a modification program to ensure all external emergency door releases do not require special keys or other equipment to operate.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006
92. The internal passenger emergency door release should be fitted with a facility which prevents it from operating unless the train is stationary.	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>93. The operation of the train doors should have an override facility whereby the train driver or the guard can override an internal passenger emergency door release system if the door release is interfered with when there is no emergency. There should be an alarm, together with an intercom, in the train guard's compartment so that, if a passenger attempts to initiate an emergency door release, there is an appropriate delay during which time an alarm sounds in the train guard's compartment and the guard can then, after first attempting to speak via the intercom to the person concerned, if necessary, override the door release, and make an appropriate announcement over the intercom system in the train.</p>	<p>Requires further detailed review. See R 89.</p>	<p>ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.</p>	<p>Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator</p>	<p>Open</p>	<p>Acceptable Response</p>	<p>*30/09/2006</p>
<p>95. All passenger trains operating in New South Wales must have the external emergency door release clearly marked with the words 'Emergency Door Release'.</p>	<p>Supported and being implemented.</p>	<p>ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a</p>	<p>Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator</p>	<p>Open</p>	<p>Acceptable Response</p>	<p>*30/09/2006</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.				
96. All RailCorp operational personnel should be trained in the location and operation of external emergency door release mechanisms.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Closed		30/04/2006
98. All trains should have windows available through which passengers can escape.	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
99. All new rail cars must have appropriate signage and lighting identifying escape routes in the case of emergency.	Supported.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006
100. All new rolling stock must be designed with an area of the roof through which emergency services personnel can access a rail car without encountering wiring or other equipment. That access point must be clearly marked with words such as "emergency services cut here".	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2006
101. ITSRR should initiate and/or participate in the development of a national standard for crashworthiness of all passenger trains.	Supported.	ITSRR will refer matter NTC for development of National Regulation. ITSRR will adopt National Regulation. In the interim ITSRR will ensure compliance with existing industry standards through its accreditation process.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/09/2007

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
103. RailCorp should establish clear safety accountability statements and reporting lines for all management positions.	Supported.	Accountability Statements implemented for all management positions.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/03/2006
105. The RailCorp Board should ensure that RailCorp has an adequate and integrated safety management system, including adequate systems for risk assessment, clearly defined safety responsibilities and accountabilities for persons holding management positions, and specific performance criteria against which evaluations can be made of safety performance and accountability for safety performance of all managers.	Supported and being implemented.	Implementation of RailCorp Safety Management System. Clearly defined accountabilities to be in the SMS documents.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005
107. RailCorp should ensure that where the safety competency of any manager is deficient such manager is required to undertake professional development courses to raise his or her safety competency level to an adequate standard.	Supported.	Review undertaken by RailCorp. Recertification plans developed.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>109. Following completion of any external audit, a corrective action plan to remedy any identified safety deficiencies should be developed by RailCorp, implemented and followed up within the business groups affected, to ensure appropriate and timely completion of the action plan, by a formal examination of the effectiveness of the controls put in place. Senior management personnel should certify that the corrective action plan has been implemented and is effective. Senior management personnel should be accountable for any such certification.</p>	<p>Supported.</p>	<p>Develop rectification plans. Formal closeout procedures/processes in place and monitoring program in place.</p>	<p>RailCorp</p>	<p>Closed</p>		<p>31/03/2006</p>
<p>121. A safety management system regulation should be promulgated, specifying the requirements of safety management systems in all accredited organisations, using Annexure I to this report as a guide.</p>	<p>Supported in principle for implementation through other means. ITSRR will introduce regulations that set out the expectations (or performance outcomes) required of industry. The regulations will be developed on a national basis, through the National Transport Commission process, to ensure consistent application across the Australian rail industry.</p>	<p>ITSRR will refer matter National Transport Commission for development of National Regulation. ITSRR will adopt National Regulation. In the interim, ITSRR has developed NAP which sets out requirements and has made NAP a condition of accreditation.</p>	<p>Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator</p>	<p>Open</p>	<p>Acceptable Response</p>	<p>*30/09/2006</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
122.a) RailCorp should establish an integrated safety management system which includes the following: a) a formal performance management system, incorporating measurable safety accountabilities and responsibilities for each managerial position;	Supported. The RailCorp Board has approved the safety strategic plan and the engagement of external experts to assist in the development of an integrated safety management system for RailCorp. The safety management system has been developed and will be implemented in 2005, consistent with the requirements of RailCorp's provisional accreditation. (a) RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	+TBA
122.b) defined safety accountability and responsibility statements for senior management;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	+TBA
122.c) an effective means of reviewing and acting upon audit investigation and review findings	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
122.d) an effective system for managing audit and investigation findings, to ensure that	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
122.e) criteria for recruitment and promotion of management staff, including safety management qualifications, experience and expertise	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	+TBA

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
122.f.vi) development of systems for monitoring the effectiveness of the controls to ensure that they are working;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
122.f.viii) development of key performance indicators for safety performance by all persons in management positions;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	+TBA
122.f.ix) development of a safety information data collection system which captures all hazards, occupational health and safety incidents, audit results, non-compliance findings and near miss reports;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
122.f.x) development of a system to arrange in priority order, on the basis of data and trend analysis, those safety deficiencies which require the most urgent attention;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
122.f.xi) design and implementation of communications protocols, including standard phraseology, with particular standard phraseology for emergency situations; and	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005