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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NSW GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE to the Final Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Waterfall Accident

Reporting Period: April - June 2007



ITSRR Quarterly Report Ten

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of Inquiry into the Waterfall Accident

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SAFETY AND
RELIABILITY
REGULATOR

31 July 2007

The Hon John Watkins MP
Deputy Premier and Minister for Transport
Level 30, Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place
Sydney NSW 2000

Dear Minister

I am pleased to provide the tenth Quarterly Report on the implementation of the Government's response to the recommendations contained within the Final Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry (SCOI) into the Waterfall Accident.

This Report reflects implementation progress from 1 April to 30 June 2007. The next report will reflect the progress made in the quarter 1 July to 30 September 2007.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Carolyn Walsh'.

Carolyn Walsh
Chief Executive

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ABBREVIATIONS

ALARP	As Low As Reasonably Practicable
ARA	Australasian Railway Association
ATP	Automatic Train Protection
ARTC	Australian Rail Track Corporation
CMC	Code Management Company
CRM	Crew Resource Management
D&A	Drug and Alcohol
ESA	Emergency Service Agencies
ITSRR	Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NROD	National Rail Occurrence Database
NRSAP	National Rail Safety Accreditation Package (also known as NAP or National Accreditation Package)
NTC	National Transport Commission
OH&S	Occupational Health and Safety
OTSI	Office of Transport Safety Investigations
PN	Pacific National Pty Ltd
RIC	Rail Infrastructure Corporation
RC	RailCorp
RMC	Rail Management Centre
RLAP	Rail Legislation Advisory Panel
RSRP	Rail Safety Regulators Panel
RSW	Rail Safety Workers
SCOI	Special Commission of Inquiry
SMS	Safety Management Systems
SMSEP	Safety Management Systems Expert Panel
TACE	Transport Agencies Chief Executives

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Special Commission of Inquiry (SCOI) into the Waterfall Rail Accident released its Final Report on 17 January 2005. In accordance with the Commission's recommendations, the NSW Government agreed that the Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator (ITSRR) should report quarterly on implementation progress. This is the tenth Quarterly Report. It outlines progress made between 1 April and 30 June 2007.

Implementation Summary

Further progress was made during the quarter with the verification and closure of 10 (6%) recommendations in the area of passenger safety. All these recommendations were directed at ITSRR as the regulator to implement. At the end of the reporting period, the cumulative implementation progress to date for all 177 recommendations (including 127 recommendations and 50 sub-elements) was as follows:


- 167 (94%) recommendations verified and closed¹;
- 3 (2%) recommendations have slipped;
- 2 (1%) recommendations previously claimed for closure by agencies has been given a revised status - open-acceptable response;
- 1 (1%) recommendation (the introduction of national communications technical standards) will be implemented by 2010; and
- 4 (2%) recommendations referred to the National Transport Commission (NTC) have revised implementation timeframes based on advice from the NTC.

This brings the total number of recommendations currently closed or claimed by agencies to be closed to 170 or 96% of all recommendations.

¹ including 5 that were rejected by the NSW Government and 1 which is no longer applicable

The current status of all of the safety actions, compared to that in previous quarters, is summarised below:

GRAPH 1: PROGRESSIVE STATUS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS BY QUARTER



As time has progressed the peak has shifted along the x-axis as the recommendations are closed.

Slippage

During the reporting period three recommendations were not satisfactorily addressed and could not be verified by ITSRR. As a result, ITSRR will request that RailCorp provides revised target dates for these slipped recommendations which are as follows:

- In the reporting period ITSRR was unable to verify implementation of recommendations 1 and 20. The intent of Recommendation 1 is to ensure that staff working in the Rail Management Centre (RMC) have been trained to quickly and accurately assess an emergency has occurred and obtain accurate and reliable information which can be conveyed to emergency response personnel to facilitate a timely and effective response. Recommendation 20 requires all Railcorp's operational rail staff to be trained in the emergency action checklist relevant to their position.

During the quarter, ITSRR reviewed a RailCorp investigation report into a major disruption to the RailCorp network that occurred in March causing significant delays and necessitating the evacuation of passengers from stranded trains. A number of issues that require further clarification and areas not specifically covered in the investigation report have been identified. As a result ITSRR has commenced its own investigation into the incident under the *Rail Safety Act 2002*. These recommendations have therefore slipped with a revised target date to be advised (Recommendations 1 & 20).

- Recommendation 53 requires train inspections to be carried out at the time of stabling RailCorp trains, as well as a part of train preparation prior to entering service. The purpose of this reform is to ensure that train defects are detected early so that sufficient time is allowed for their

repair. This should reduce pressure on those inspecting the trains just prior to service from allowing trains to enter into service with defects that could impact on their safe operation.

RailCorp has claimed closure of this recommendation, noting that they have a process for inspecting trains at the time that they are stabled and at time of preparation prior to service. ITSRR has been provided with documentation outlining that process.

The inspection process has been distributed for information to RailCorp staff.

RailCorp has also provided ITSRR with a copy of an internal verification report on the process demonstrating that inspections are undertaken.

However, to enable closure of this recommendation, ITSRR requires evidence that faults identified from inspections at stabling are recorded in RailCorp's electronic defect reporting database (METRE) and are being rectified before the train preparation inspection prior to entering service. ITSRR is also seeking confirmation that RailCorp has a process for reviewing faults identified during train preparation to determine whether they should have been identified during the inspection at stabling.

During the quarter, RailCorp was unable to produce this documentation, and the recommendation's implementation has therefore slipped. During the next quarter ITSRR will write to RailCorp seeking confirmation of whether this process is in place, and if not, requesting a revised timeframe for this to be implemented (Recommendation 53).

METHODOLOGY

This section briefly outlines the processes ITSRR has instituted to develop and monitor the Implementation Plan for the Government's response to the SCOI Final Report into the Waterfall Rail Accident. Full details of these methods can be found in Appendix 2.

Implementation Plan

ITSRR reviewed the SCOI Final Report and determined the actions required to implement each recommendation (in line with the Government's response) and which company or agency has responsibility for that action. These expectations formed the basis for determining whether the response put forward by a company or agency is appropriate to meet the recommendation and/or satisfy the safety objective of the recommendation.

Responsible agencies assigned indicative timeframes for each safety action and ITSRR reviewed the appropriateness of them to ensure the timeframes were feasible and that processes were in place to adequately monitor progress as well as to give sufficient notice and justification to ITSRR for any changes to the implementation plan. Timeframes agreed with responsible companies or agencies have, to the greatest extent possible, been made realistic and achievable. Details of the Implementation Plan and progress against it may be found in Appendix 3.

Classification System for Recommendations

In order to provide a graduated view of progress against the Implementation Plan, ITSRR developed a classification system to indicate the relative status of each recommendation. The taxonomy for the Classification System has been drawn from accepted international practice. Appendix 1 includes tables and graphs of the current implementation status of recommendations.

Slippage

In reporting slippage against the agreed timeframes in the Implementation Plan, ITSRR uses the following guide:

- If a claim for closure was expected by the conclusion of the reporting quarter but was not received then it is recorded as slippage;
- If a claim for closure is submitted to ITSRR by the end of the reporting quarter but the target date was earlier in the quarter, it will not be recorded as slippage; and
- If a revised target date for implementation was received from an agency but action will be completed within the original reporting quarter then it is not recorded as slippage. However in the event that the revised target date is not met, ITSRR will record the event as a slippage.


SUMMARY OF PROGRESS

The SCOI was given the task of identifying the causes of the Waterfall accident and ways of preventing such accidents in the future. The Commission was also asked to examine what might lead to overall improvements in the safety management of rail operations in NSW. The SCOI Final Report grouped recommendations under 19 safety themes. These relate to both the causes of the accident and to suggested improvements in the overall management of safety on the NSW rail network.

In this Report, implementation progress is summarised against these 19 safety themes. It outlines progress in the reporting quarter, any slippage against agreed timeframes and any action taken by the responsible agency and/or ITSRR to address slippage. Recommendations closed out in earlier quarters are not covered in detail in this report. Previous quarterly reports are available on ITSRR's website www.transportregulator.nsw.gov.au This approach provides the necessary transparency to ensure appropriate public scrutiny of progress made in implementing the Government's response to the SCOI Final Report.

The graph below illustrates the status of recommendations as at 30 June 2007. As time has progressed the peak has shifted (as expected) along the x-axis as all recommendations are closed.

GRAPH 1: PROGRESSIVE STATUS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS BY QUARTER



Emergency Response

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 1-28

These recommendations relate to the Commission's findings that emergency response procedures to the Waterfall Rail Accident were inadequate. They are intended to ensure that (in the event of a future rail accident) RailCorp has effective procedures in place that will enable it to locate the accident site, secure and isolate it, ensure safety at the site and facilitate access of emergency services.

The recommendations also aim to ensure that any such emergency response is coordinated between relevant parties and is timely. These recommendations require the provision of supporting emergency procedures and appropriate training in those procedures. Recommendations 2-19 and 21-28 are closed.

In the reporting period ITSRR was unable to verify implementation of recommendations 1 and 20. The intent of Recommendation 1 is to ensure that staff working in the Rail Management Centre (RMC) have been trained to quickly and accurately assess an emergency has occurred and obtain accurate and reliable information which can be conveyed to emergency response personnel to facilitate a timely and effective response. Recommendation 20 requires all Railcorp's operational rail staff to be trained in the emergency action checklist relevant to their position.

During the quarter, ITSRR reviewed a RailCorp investigation report into a major disruption to the RailCorp network that occurred in March causing significant delays and necessitating the evacuation of passengers from stranded trains. A number of issues that require further clarification and areas not specifically covered in the investigation report have been identified. As a result ITSRR has commenced its own investigation into the incident under the *Rail Safety Act 2002*. These recommendations have therefore slipped with a revised target date to be advised (Recommendations 1 & 20).

Design and Procurement of Rolling stock

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 29-30

The Commission recommended that all railway operators should have a quality assurance program in place for the design and construction of rolling stock and that the rail safety regulator should set standards for the design, manufacture, testing and commissioning of rolling stock to ensure that it is fit for purpose. Recommendation 29 is closed.

In December 2006 the Australian Transport Council (ATC) voted in favour of the Rail Safety Model Regulations. Item P of Schedule 1 to the Model Regulations require rail transport operators to have (and incorporate as part of their safety management system) a documented set of engineering standards and procedures, and operational systems, safety standards and procedures, to cover rail infrastructure, rolling stock and operational systems and, if relevant, the interface between any two or more of them. The regulations also require the rail transport operator to have systems, procedures and standards sufficient to manage the lifecycle of the rail infrastructure and rolling stock from design, construction, and installation through to decommissioning or disposal.

In the next quarter ITSRR will continue work to finalise NSW regulations to reflect the National Rail Safety Model Regulations with the aim of implementing these regulations by December 2007. In light of this, a revised target date of December 2007 has been set (Recommendation 30).

Driver Safety Systems

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 31-33

These recommendations are intended to minimise the risk of an accident in the event of train driver incapacitation by requiring the fitting of two independent engineering defences to all trains. In the longer term the SCOI recommended the introduction of Automatic Train Protection (ATP). The Government supports this in principle; however, its application on an industry-wide basis needs to be determined. ATP systems are more advanced technologies which can automatically override a driver if a train is behaving in an unauthorised way in relation to network constraints. Recommendations 31 and 33 are closed.

Risk Assessment and Risk Control Procedures

SCOI Final Report Recommendation 34

Recommendation 34 and its sub-elements seek to make the rail network safer by ensuring that RailCorp has in place processes to systematically identify and assess risks on the network and put appropriate control measures in place to reduce or eliminate circumstances which might result in an accident. This recommendation and its sub-elements are closed.

Data Loggers

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 36-37

Data loggers record information on a train's operations; including, for example, speed during a journey. During any accident or incident investigation effective use of data loggers can provide investigators with information to help them understand the causes of accidents or incidents on the rail network. Data loggers can also assist rail operators to monitor safety performance.

It was previously reported that the National Transport Commission (NTC) agreed to develop a national regulation for data loggers subject to the outcome of an impact assessment. The results of the impact assessment indicate that amendments to the model regulations are necessary to establish a new requirement: that rolling stock operators ensure they are in a position to provide certain information relevant to the operation of their rolling stock if and when an accident or incident occurs. It is believed that this will satisfy the intent of recommendations 36 and 37 and is an acceptable alternative response. The NTC advises it will instruct the (soon to be formed) Maintenance Group for the model regulations to develop an appropriate amendment to the model regulations. The regulation is expected to be completed by mid 2008 and therefore the new revised interim date for these recommendations is 30 June 2008.

In the interim ITSRR has developed guidance material concerning the use of data loggers on rolling stock operating within NSW. This guidance material is designed to assist in ensuring that all rolling stock operating in NSW are fitted with serviceable and operating data loggers so that, in the event of an accident or incident, investigators can access, read and use the information that is contained on the data logger. The ITSRR guidance material, has been developed in consultation with industry and unions via the Rail Safety Strategic Forum (RSSF) with the intent to be released in early July 2007 (see ITSRR's website at www.transportregulator.nsw.gov.au).

Communications

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 38- 46

These recommendations address two important issues. First, that standardised communications protocols should be in use on the NSW rail network so that rail employees use clear and well understood language when communicating with each other. This is particularly important in emergency situations. Second, the compatibility and inter-operability of communications equipment (radios for example), so that in an emergency drivers, signalers, train controllers and other relevant personnel (with different types of communications equipment) are able to talk to each other. Recommendations 39 – 42 and 44 - 46 are closed and the introduction of national communications technical standards will be implemented by 2010 (Recommendation 38).

It was previously reported that the National Transport Commission (NTC) agreed to develop a national regulation for communication systems/protocols subject to the outcome of an impact assessment. The outcomes of the impact assessment has led the NTC to conclude that it is not appropriate to mandate communication terminology, protocols and procedures through the use of regulations. The assessment found that as regulations would apply across the board, their introduction would force many rail infrastructure managers and interfacing rolling stock operators to bear the cost of a transition that is

unjustified on safety and efficiency grounds. However, it would be free to an individual state regulator to either:

(a) enforce rail safety duties, giving particular attention to interface agreements between rail infrastructure managers and rolling stock operators such that the regulator is assured that all have committed themselves to standardised communications terminology, procedures and protocols; or

(b) if not satisfied that the interfacing parties are able to standardise communications between themselves, mandate consistent communication terminology, protocols and procedures as a condition of accreditation.

ITSRR believes a national regulation may still be appropriate for some circumstances and therefore intends to continue discussions with the NTC on this matter. A new revised interim date of December 2007 has been set (Recommendation 43).

Train Maintenance

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 47-53

The purpose of these recommendations is to ensure there are minimum standards and inspections in place for RailCorp trains entering service and adequate maintenance plans and systems in place to record and rectify train defects, as well as certification of work by an appropriately qualified individual. Recommendations 47-52 are closed.

Recommendation 53 requires train inspections to be carried out at the time of stabling RailCorp trains, as well as a part of train preparation prior to entering service. The purpose of this reform is to ensure that train defects are detected early so that sufficient time is allowed for their repair. This should reduce pressure on those inspecting the trains just prior to service from allowing trains to enter into service with defects that could impact on their safe operation.

RailCorp has claimed closure of this recommendation, noting that they have a process for inspecting trains at the time that they are stabled and at time of preparation prior to service. ITSRR has been provided with documentation outlining that process.

The inspection process has been distributed for information to RailCorp staff.

RailCorp has also provided ITSRR with a copy of an internal verification report on the process demonstrating that inspections are undertaken.

However, to enable closure of this recommendation, ITSRR requires evidence that faults identified from inspections at stabling are recorded in RailCorp's electronic defect reporting database (METRE) and are being rectified before the train preparation inspection prior to entering service. ITSRR is also seeking confirmation that RailCorp has a process for reviewing faults identified during train preparation to determine whether they should have been identified during the inspection at stabling.

During the quarter, RailCorp was unable to produce this documentation, and the recommendation's implementation has therefore slipped. During the next quarter ITSRR will write to RailCorp seeking confirmation of whether this process is in place, and if not, requesting a revised timeframe for this to be implemented.

Alcohol and Drug Testing

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 54-56

These recommendations are intended to ensure random drug and alcohol (D&A) testing continue and that testing is made mandatory following an incident. The *Rail Safety Act 2002* and supporting D&A testing regulations and guidelines require accredited operators to have a D&A program in place. They also enable operators to conduct post-incident D&A testing, but do not explicitly require such testing. These recommendations are closed.

Periodic Medical Examinations

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 57(a)-(j)

This recommendation is directed at minimising the risk of incapacitation of a train driver through more stringent standards for periodic medical examinations for railway safety critical workers. The majority of safety actions required for this recommendation have been implemented, verified and closed through the adoption of the National Standard for Health Assessment of Rail Safety Workers. This recommendation and its sub-elements are closed.

Safety Document Control

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 58-64

Effective document control, particularly document control of safety information, is a critical element of a rail operator's safety management system. Employers and employees must be confident that the safety information they are operating under is current and accurate. All of these recommendations are now closed.

Train Driver and Guard Training

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 65 - 71

It is important that train drivers and train guards are adequately trained in the performance of their duties. This issue was also raised by the SCOI into the Glenbrook accident. Of particular interest for training is the appropriate use of simulators, encouragement of teamwork, and the development of training based on a needs analysis. Recommendations 65-70 are closed.

As reported last quarter RailCorp has adopted the concept of Team Leaders and created these positions in its establishment, however delays in filling these positions have occurred due to ongoing negotiations and consultation with service unions which has taken longer than anticipated. As a result a revised target date of 30 December 2007 was set for Recommendation 71.

Rail Accident Investigation

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 72 - 82

The SCOI Final Report promulgated “just culture” investigations (ie, those aimed at determining all the factors contributing to an accident, including systemic factors rather than attempting to allocate blame or liability), as more likely to contribute to improved safety outcomes in the longer term. Recommendations 72 -74 and 82 concern the powers of, and relationship between, the NSW Office of Transport Safety Investigations (OTSI) and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). All of these recommendations are closed.

Safety Culture

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 83 - 84

It is accepted safety practice that a positive safety culture works in tandem with a safety management system to deliver safe operations. The safety culture recommendations require a plan from RailCorp and a subsequent review by ITSRR. All of these recommendations are closed.

Occupational Health and Safety

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 85 - 87

Recommendations 85-87 articulated the SCOI’s concern that RailCorp’s approach to safety management was overly focused on occupational health and safety (OHS). By this it meant that RailCorp primarily sought to implement risk control measures for risks of relatively low consequence, but high frequency, to the detriment of more significant risks of relatively high consequence, but low frequency. The SCOI recommended integration of OHS management into RailCorp’s overall safety management system, so that broader public safety concerns, such as derailments or collisions, would receive greater attention. All of these recommendations are closed.

Passenger Safety

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 88-101

These recommendations address emergency egress and access (ie, ways in which passengers can escape from trains in an emergency and the way emergency services and other rescuers can get into trains), emergency evacuation procedures and associated training and standards, as well as the adequacy of penalties for misuse of emergency and other safety related equipment.

In the reporting period recommendations 89-93, 95 and 98-101 were verified and closed “subject to the implementation of the approved program or plan”.

In response to the Waterfall recommendations, ITSRR conducted a review and produced a report entitled "Train Door Emergency Egress and Access and Emergency Evacuation Procedures" which found that there should be a means for passenger initiated evacuation in the event of an extreme emergency. It was released to the rail industry in November 2004 for information and consideration. Subsequently during 2005, ITSRR developed guidance based on the findings of its report outlining principles to be addressed when considering passenger emergency egress and evacuation.

At the same time, RailCorp conducted its own risk assessment of its passenger emergency egress and evacuation arrangements with a view to determining whether its Passenger Containment Policy ought to be replaced. In response to the risk assessment, RailCorp concluded that recommendations calling for emergency windows and the installation of a manual override for use by guards should not be pursued and revised its Passenger Containment Policy accordingly. This new policy requires the installation of emergency door release mechanisms that permit passengers to self-evacuate if needed in the event of an emergency and evacuation of passengers through to other carriages in the event of an emergency in line with the outcomes of its risk assessment. ITSRR accepted RailCorp's risk assessment and its revised Passenger Containment Policy as an effective alternative response to the

recommendations. As a result, RailCorp has commenced the implementation of a program to retro-fit its existing rollingstock with emergency door releases. ITSRR will continue to monitor the implementation of this program.

In 2006, the Government announced that 700 new train carriages will be fitted with door release mechanisms before they enter into service through a public private partnership (PPP). To ensure that the SCOI recommendations relating to passenger emergency egress were properly addressed through the PPP, ITSRR indicated to RailCorp that it would be using its guidance material on principles for passenger emergency egress and evacuation when assessing specifications for the PPP.

As noted in earlier quarterly reports, ITSRR has also referred these recommendations to the NTC to conduct an impact assessment to ascertain if process regulations should be developed to support such requirements in the national regulatory framework. While this is not technically required to meet the specific obligations of the Waterfall recommendations, it is prudent to ensure that any such requirements in the future be entrenched in regulation and/or in Australian Rolling Stock Standards.

In December 2006, following ITSRR's referral to the NTC, the Australian Transport Council (ATC) voted in favour of national Rail Safety Model Regulations. Item P of Schedule 1 to the Model Regulations require rail transport operators to have (and incorporate as part of their SMS) a documented set of engineering standards and procedures, and operational systems, safety standards and procedures, to cover rail infrastructure, rolling stock and operational systems and, if relevant, the interface between any two or more of them. The regulations also require the rail transport operator to have systems, procedures and standards sufficient to manage the lifecycle of the rail infrastructure and rolling stock from design, construction, and installation through to decommissioning or disposal.

The NTC National Rail Safety Regulations therefore provide an overall framework for the development and procurement of rolling stock including passenger emergency egress and evacuation.

The NTC also advised that these recommendations should be referred to the Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board (RISSB) to be considered as part of the Rolling Stock Standard development. In June 2007, ITSRR also provided RISSB with ITSRR's guidance material with regard to emergency egress, access and evacuation procedures. RISSB has confirmed that it will consider this guidance in the development of the standards and, in particular is giving consideration to the Waterfall recommendations in the development of the Rolling Stock Code (Recommendations 89-93, 95, 98-101).

Corporate Governance

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 102- 109

These recommendations introduce requirements for formal qualifications in system safety management for managers who report to the CEO of RailCorp. They also require development of safety accountability statements and reporting lines for all management positions and the introduction of independent external and internal audit processes to be managed by the RailCorp Board. All of these recommendations have been closed in previous quarters.

Safety Reform

SCOI Final Report Recommendation 110(a)-(e)

This recommendation sought to create a position of Safety Reform Program Director to manage the safety reform program being undertaken by RailCorp and detailed various aspects of the duties that should be undertaken by this position. All of these recommendations are closed.

Safety Regulation

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 111-120

These recommendations addressed the role of ITSRR in relation to safety regulation, the governance of ITSRR and the need for more explicit guidelines from ITSRR. All of these recommendations are closed.

Integrated Safety Management

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 121- 124

These recommendations advocated that a regulation be promulgated specifying the requirements of a safety management system (SMS) (Recommendation 121) and the steps RailCorp needs to take to ensure that its SMS is integrated (Recommendation 122 – 124). All of these recommendations are closed.

Summary

A total of 170 (or 96%) of the recommendations contained in the NSW Government's response to the SCOI into the Waterfall Accident have either been closed (94%) or slipped (2%).

The implementation of these SCOI recommendations has resulted in a range of important and practical improvements to current rail safety operational practices in NSW. More importantly, the recommendations are driving changes in safety culture and continuously improving risk management in rail operations which will underpin the delivery of sustainable improvements in rail safety into the future.

APPENDIX 1 – TABLES AND GRAPHS

This table lists the recommendations for which each agency is responsible:

TABLE 1: RECOMMENDATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY	RECOMMENDATIONS FROM SCOI FINAL REPORT	NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS
RailCorp	1-8, 10-14, 16-20, 22, 25-27, 32, 34(a) – (h), 40, 47-53, 56, 58-62, 65-71, 83(a)-(n), 85-88, 96, 102-110(a)-(e), 122(a)-(f(i-xii)), 123,	103
Emergency Services Agencies	15, 97	2
Emergency Services Agencies & RailCorp	9, 21, 23, 24, 28	5
ITSRR	29, 30, 31, 33, 36-39, 41-46, 54-55, 57(a)-(i), 63-64, 75-80, 84, 89-95, 98-101, 113-117, 119-121, 124-125(a)-(b), 126	57
OTSI	72, 73, 74, 81, 82	5
Not assigned	35, 111, 112, 118, 127	5
TOTAL	127	177


At the end of the second quarter 2007, the status of the 177 Recommendations including sub-elements of the SCOI Final Report is detailed in the following table:

TABLE 2: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS AS AT 30 JUNE 2007

Operator	Open - Awaiting Response	Open-Response Received	Open - Acceptable Response	Open - Acceptable Alternate Response	Open-Response Rejected	Open - Company Claims Closure	Closed - Recommendation Rejected	Closed - N/A	Closed - Action Verified	Closed - Action Not verified	Total
Not Assigned							5				5
RailCorp			2			3			98		103
Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator			5						52		57
Office of Transport Safety Investigation			0					1	4		5
NSW Emergency Services			0						2		2
RailCorp/ NSW Emergency Services			0			0			5		5
TOTAL	0	0	7	0	0	3	5	1	161	0	177

The graph below illustrates the recommendations according to their respective status.

GRAPH 2: CURRENT STATUS OF AGGREGATE RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS AS AT 30 JUNE 2007.



In the SCOI Final Report recommendations were listed against specific themes or topics relating to the causal factors associated with the Waterfall Rail Accident. The following table presents the status of recommendations by these themes:

TABLE 3: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THEME AS AT 30 JUNE 2007

Theme	Open - Awaiting Response	Open - Response Received	Open - Acceptable Response	Open - Acceptable Alternative Response	Open - Response Rejected by ITSRR	Open - Company Claims Closure	Closed Recommendation Rejected	Closed - No Longer Applicable	Closed Action Verified	Closed - Action Not Verified	Total
Emergency response 1-28	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	26	0	28
Procurement & design of rolling stock 29-30	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Driver safety systems 31-33	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3
Risk assessment and control procedures 34-35	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	9
Data loggers 36-37	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Communications 38-46	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	9
Train Maintenance 47-53	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	0	7
Alcohol and Drug Testing 54-56	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
Periodic Medical Examinations 57	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	9
Safety Document Control 58-64	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	7
Train Driver and Guard Training 65-71	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	7
Rail Accident Investigation 72-82	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	0	11
Safety Culture 83-84	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	15
OH&S 85-87	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
Passenger safety 88-101	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	0	14
Corporate Governance 102-109	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	8
Safety Reform 110	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
Safety Regulation 111-120	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	7	0	10
Integrated Safety Management 121-124	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	0	21
Implementation of Recommendations 125-127	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	4

APPENDIX 2 – METHODOLOGY

This section outlines the processes which ITSRR has instituted to develop and monitor the Implementation Plan for the Government's response to the SCOI Final Report into the Waterfall Rail Accident.

Implementation Plan

ITSRR has reviewed the SCOI Final Report and determined action required to implement each recommendation in line with the Government's response and which company or agency has responsibility for that action. These expectations then formed the basis for determining whether the response put forward by a company or agency is appropriate to meet the recommendation and/or satisfy the safety objective of the recommendation. Responsible agencies have assigned indicative timeframes for each safety action and ITSRR will review the appropriateness of each. Timeframes agreed with responsible companies or agencies have, to the greatest extent possible, been made realistic and achievable. Details of the Implementation Plan and progress against it may be found in Appendix 3 at page 49.

Classification System for Recommendations

In order to provide a graduated view of progress against the Implementation Plan, ITSRR has developed a classification system to indicate the relative status of each recommendation. The taxonomy for the Classification System has been drawn from accepted international practice and is listed in Table 4 at page 34 below.

The process for assigning status to a recommendation is as follows:

Step 1 The Government's response to the SCOI Final Report determined which recommendations were accepted. ITSRR has articulated its expectations in regards to all remaining recommendations.

- Step 2 All accepted recommendations are assigned the status "Open - Await Response". These recommendations are then referred by ITSRR to the relevant company or agency to prepare a response to the recommendation(s) and submit it to ITSRR.
- Step 3 ITSRR reviews the response and determines whether it is acceptable or not. If it is acceptable then the status of the recommendation is assigned either "Open - Acceptable Response" or "Open - Acceptable Alternative Response". A recommendation would be assigned an "Open - Acceptable Alternative Response" status when the intent of a recommendation will be met but will be implemented by alternative means. If the response is not acceptable then the recommendation is assigned the status of "Open - Response Rejected". In this case, the company or agency is informed of the decision and requested to re-submit a revised response taking into account ITSRR's concerns. This process continues until the response to the recommendation is accepted by ITSRR.
- Step 4 ITSRR monitors progress of all accepted responses to ensure a company or agency is meeting agreed implementation timeframes. This is done through both desktop reviews of reports received by agencies and in-field inspections to verify progress claimed.
- Step 5 Once a company or agency has completed a required action it will submit to ITSRR a claim for closure of the recommendation. This application indicates that the company or agency believes it has completed the required action. The status of the recommendation is changed to "Open – Company Claims Closure".
- Step 6 In most cases, ITSRR will verify closure through an in field compliance inspection or audit. Once verification has taken

place the recommendation status is changed to indicate it is "Closed - Verified".

This process will continue until all recommendations are closed.

TABLE 4: TAXONOMY FOR CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

	STATUS	DEFINITION
1.	Open – Await Response	This status is automatically assigned to an accepted recommendation. Affected parties will be asked to submit their response for implementing the recommendation to ITSRR.
2.	Open – Response Received	ITSRR has received a response from an affected party and this response is under review by ITSRR. It has not yet been accepted by ITSRR.
3.	Open – Acceptable Response	ITSRR agrees that the planned action, when completed, meets the recommendation.
4.	Open – Acceptable Alternative Response	ITSRR agrees that alternative action, when completed, satisfies the objective of the recommendation.
5.	Open – Response Rejected by ITSRR	ITSRR does not agree that the planned or alternate action meets the recommendation. The company or agency is advised of the rejection and requested to provide a revised response.
6.	Open – Company Claims Closure	The company or agency claims that the planned or alternate action has been completed. The action has not yet been verified by ITSRR. ITSRR has not yet agreed that the item is closed.
7.	Closed – Recommendation Rejected	ITSRR has determined through further analysis and review that the recommendation is not appropriate (i.e. will not achieve the desired safety outcomes) and has rejected the recommendation. It is therefore closed.
8.	Closed – No Longer Applicable	The recommendation has been overtaken by events and action is no longer required. For example, a new technology has eliminated the reason for the recommendation, it has been superseded by other recommendations issued, or the operator affected has gone out of business.

9.	Closed – Action Verified	Completion of the planned or alternate action has been verified by ITSRR through a compliance inspection or audit.
10.	Closed – Action Not Verified	ITSRR accepts that the planned or alternate action has been completed following a review of documentation submitted. Field verification is not necessary.

RailCorp & Other Rail Operators

The SCOI Final Report primarily focused on RailCorp and actions required by it to improve safety as a consequence of the Waterfall Rail Accident. In quarterly reports therefore, ITSRR will report on recommendations specific to RailCorp. However, some recommendations from the Final Report may also be relevant to other rail operators in NSW. In light of this, ITSRR has reviewed the recommendations and identified where other rail operators may also be required to improve safety operations.

Where recommendations have applicability to the wider rail industry, ITSRR will report on progress of its own actions to ensure other operators also meet the intent of SCOI recommendations and on any general areas of concern about implementation issues across the industry. Progress on specific safety actions by other rail operators will not be reported upon in ITSRR quarterly reports.

ITSRR

ITSRR is also responsible for implementing recommendations from the SCOI Final Report. These quarterly reports will assess progress made by ITSRR on those recommendations. The same methodology as outlined above will be used to assess the implementation status of recommendations for which ITSRR is responsible. ITSRR has established an internal process between Divisions which allows for an independent assessment of whether

recommendations are being implemented according to the Implementation Plan and to ensure status reports accurately reflect progress against the Plan. The Chief Executive must sign off on all completed actions before a recommendation is closed.

Other Agencies

ITSRR has held meetings with the Office of Emergency Services and the Office of Transport Safety Investigation (OTSI) to review and discuss the implementation and reporting of recommendations under their responsibility. Review of responses from these agencies will also follow the process outlined above and will be reported quarterly. ITSRR has agreed to timeframes and actions with each of these agencies.

APPENDIX 3 – IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATIONS

NB: This table lists only the recommendations which were closed in the last quarter, or remain to be implemented. Those recommendations closed in previous quarters do not appear. A complete list of all recommendations is contained in the First Report, on ITSRR’s website at: <http://www.transportregulator.nsw.gov.au>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
1. Staff at the Rail Management Centre (RMC) should receive training from RailCorp to enable them to quickly and accurately assess that an emergency has occurred and to provide precise and reliable information to emergency response personnel about the location of the emergency, the available access to the site and the resources necessary.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues identified in the SCOI.(Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum). b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/03/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
20. All operational rail staff should be trained by RailCorp in the action check list relevant to each.	Supported.	That a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies. The details of the plan are to include, amongst other things: immediate response, site management and recovery processes. Also requires the development of: - Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures.- Development of Network Incident Management plan with RailCorp (Track Manager).- Training Issues to ensure that staff can implement.- Development / Implementation of checklists- Distribution of the checklists and alignment with the staff training and emergency exercises. To ensure that training requirements met under Recommendation 3 namely, RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues (includes Development Process,	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	30/06/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		Training Aids / Curriculum); b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers; c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff; d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes; e) Evidence of Training of Skills assessment; f) Evidence of responsibilities in PD; g) Evidence of responsibilities reflected in plan. To ensure that staff can implement emergency procedures in respect of Recommendations: 11 (use by all emergency response personnel of a uniform incident command system); 12 (appointment of a rail emergency management co-ordinator at the RMC, and an on-site rail commander); 13 (Site				

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		<p>Controller to have complete control of the site & the Rail Commander must report to this position); 14 (Incident Command System has clearly identified roles and that a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies); 16 (rail commander should provide support and assistance to the site controller and emergency services personnel); 17 (The rail commander should have complete authority to direct and control all response personnel from rail organisations); 19 (The RailCorp emergency response plan should include action checklists of the steps that each employee is required to take, and the order for specific employees to follow in case of emergency.</p>				

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>30. The rail safety regulator should set standards for the design, manufacture, testing and commissioning of rolling stock to ensure that the rolling stock is fit for its purpose.</p>	<p>Supported in principle and being implemented through other means. ITSRR will introduce regulations including for rolling stock that set out the expectations (or performance outcomes) required of industry. The regulations will be developed on a national basis, through the National Transport Commission process, to ensure consistent application across the Australian rail industry. Notwithstanding the expectation that industry will develop and maintain appropriate safety standards, ITSRR will retain the power to mandate such standards if the industry clearly fails to deliver satisfactory safety outcomes.</p>	<p>ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation. In the interim, ITSRR will require operators, through the accreditation process to meet existing industry standards for rolling stock acquisition, including AS4292, rolling stock units, Train Operating Conditions and Industry technical codes.</p>	<p>Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator</p>	<p>Open</p>	<p>Acceptable Response</p>	<p>30/12/2007</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>32. RailCorp should progressively implement, within a reasonable time, level 2 automatic train protection with the features identified in chapter 8 of this report.</p>	<p>Requires further detailed review. The Government supports the implementation of additional train protection systems. Implementation of level 2 ATP as detailed in the recommendation would involve the replacement of all line-side signalling on the RailCorp network with on-train control systems. In addition every intra and inter-state train accessing the network would also need to be equipped with level 2 ATP technology. RailCorp has already retained consultants to undertake evaluation and risk assessment regarding implementation of additional automatic train protection systems on the RailCorp network. RailCorp will work with the Australian Rail Track Corporation (which operates the interstate network) to develop, in conjunction with ITSRR and interstate rail regulators, a national</p>	<p>A detailed technical review of available options. This is to be a project lead by RailCorp. The major outcome of the project is to be a business case for Government concerning ATP.</p>	<p>RailCorp</p>	<p>Open</p>	<p>Acceptable Response</p>	<p>* 30/06/2008</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	<p>standard for an automatic train protection system. RailCorp will also undertake a comprehensive review which will include a risk assessment, technical feasibility and cost benefit analysis of introducing level 1 ATP as well as level 2 ATP, as recommended by the Commission. Consistent with recommendation 34 any future options will need to be assessed by independent verification of acceptable risk.</p>					

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
36. The ITSRR should impose a standard in relation to the collection and use of data from data loggers.	Supported in principle for implementation through other means. ITSRR will introduce regulations including for data loggers that set out the expectations (or performance outcomes) required of industry. The regulations will be developed on a national basis, through the National Transport Commission process, to ensure consistent application across the Australian rail industry. Notwithstanding the expectation that industry will develop and maintain appropriate safety standards, ITSRR will retain the power to mandate such standards if the industry clearly fails to deliver satisfactory safety outcomes.	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation. In the interim, ITSRR will review existing standards set in access agreements to ensure adequate standards for collection and use of data.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/06/2008

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
37. The standard in relation to the collection and use of data from data loggers should provide that such information must be accessed in the circumstances of any accident or incident and can be accessed to monitor driver performance generally.	Supported in principle for implementation through other means. (See R 36) Information from data loggers can be accessed to monitor for any incident or accident and can be accessed to monitor a driver's performance generally.	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation ITSRR will adopt National Regulation In the interim, ITSRR will seek from RailCorp proposals to improve the monitoring of driver performance (especially for training purposes)	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	*30/06/2008
38. There must be compatibility of communications systems throughout the rail network. It is essential that all train drivers, train controllers, signallers, train guards and supervisors of trackside work gangs in New South Wales be able to communicate using the same technology.	Supported and being implemented. The National Standing Committee of Transport endorsed the Australasian Railway Association working with operators and regulators, including RailCorp and ITSRR, to develop a national approach on communications systems, which has agreed minimum functionality requirements for train radio systems. RailCorp plans to implement a digital train radio system. An objective of this system is for it to be interoperable with existing analogue radio	ITSRR to ensure functionality and compatibility requirements included in national standard, currently under development by the Australasian Railway Association. ITSRR to ensure RailCorp/ARTC Radio Functionality for next generation technology compatibility requirements.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	31/12/2010

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	systems. Because of the technical complexities associated with achieving inter-operability, this has been a longer-term initiative and the first stage of its implementation will commence in 2005.					
43. Communications protocols and procedures should be standardised. and mandated by regulations making them a condition of accreditation.	Supported. As for R 39.	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation ITSRR will adopt National Regulation. In the interim, ITSRR will enforce compliance with the current protocols through its accreditation, audit and compliance activities.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/12/2007

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
53. Train inspections should be carried out at the time of stabling RailCorp trains, as well as a part of train preparation prior to entering service.	Supported in principle for further review. RailCorp is reviewing procedures and resources to rectify defects. RailCorp provides time for drivers of stabling trains to report any noted defect.	A document risk assessment and/or business case by RailCorp, detailing how train integrity on entering into service is to be managed.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/10/2005
71. The position of team leader should be created by RailCorp to be responsible for a group of approximately 30 train drivers, with responsibility to ensure that each train driver's training needs are being met and that any safety concerns of train drivers are being properly addressed. The team leaders are to have direct access to the Chief Executive of RailCorp if any safety concerns they have are not addressed	Supported in principle for further review. RailCorp is reviewing the current supervisory structure of train crewing in light of this recommendation.	Creation of appropriate position to carry out functions outlined in Rec 71.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	31/12/2007
89. There must be a minimum of two independent methods of self-initiated emergency escape for passengers from all trains at all times.	Requires further detailed review, subject to the risk assessment referred to in R88.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		# 30/04/2007

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
90. All passenger trains must be fitted with an internal passenger emergency door release.	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		# 30/04/2007
91. All passenger trains operating in New South Wales must be fitted with external emergency door releases which do not require any special key or other equipment to operate.	Supported and being implemented. RailCorp has commenced a modification program to ensure all external emergency door releases do not require special keys or other equipment to operate.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		# 30/04/2007

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
92. The internal passenger emergency door release should be fitted with a facility which prevents it from operating unless the train is stationary.	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		# 30/04/2007
93. The operation of the train doors should have an override facility whereby the train driver or the guard can override an internal passenger emergency door release system if the door release is interfered with when there is no emergency. There should be an alarm, together with an intercom, in the train guard's compartment so that, if a passenger attempts to initiate an emergency door release, there is an appropriate delay during which time an alarm sounds in the train guard's compartment and the guard can then, after first attempting to speak via the intercom to the person concerned, if necessary,	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		# 30/04/2007

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
override the door release, and make an appropriate announcement over the intercom system in the train.						
95. All passenger trains operating in New South Wales must have the external emergency door release clearly marked with the words 'Emergency Door Release'.	Supported and being implemented.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		# 30/04/2007

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
98. All trains should have windows available through which passengers can escape.	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		# 30/04/2007
99. All new rail cars must have appropriate signage and lighting identifying escape routes in the case of emergency.	Supported.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		# 30/04/2007

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
100. All new rolling stock must be designed with an area of the roof through which emergency services personnel can access a rail car without encountering wiring or other equipment. That access point must be clearly marked with words such as "emergency services cut here".	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		# 30/04/2007
101. ITSRR should initiate and/or participate in the development of a national standard for crashworthiness of all passenger trains.	Supported.	ITSRR will refer matter NTC for development of National Regulation. ITSRR will adopt National Regulation. In the interim ITSRR will ensure compliance with existing industry standards through its accreditation process.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		# 30/09/2007