Automatic Train Protection - ONRSR and Sydney Trains - Case Study

ONRSR Driven Safety Improvement

Speed restrictions have been introduced at the highest risk turnouts and an initial $5 million for preliminary design work on engineering improvements has been allocated. ONRSR’s focus on this risk has also resulted in a broader review of the level of train protection across metropolitan passenger networks nationwide.

Background

ONRSR engaged with both Sydney Trains as the rail infrastructure manager for the network, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) as the delivery agency for the historical automatic train protection (ATP) project and the current Digital Systems Program (DSP).

Delivery of the DSP will see the introduction of European Train Control System (ECTS) level 2, which will provide full supervision of trains via a continuous, real-time exchange of information between trains and a central control centre, using onboard computers, trackside sensors, and radio communication.

ONRSR's Engagement

ONRSR became increasingly concerned by a series of overspeed events through 25 km/h turnouts that occurred in western Sydney over a period of 20 months between October 2023 and March 2025. Collectively these incidents raised significant doubts as to whether associated safety risks were being managed SFAIRP.

ONRSR opened enquiries into two of the overspeed incidents, where turnout speed restrictions had been exceeded by 60 km/h and 70 km/h respectively, and soon broadened the probe to assess the state of turnout protection across the Sydney Trains network. The work would prove invaluable, revealing that only a fraction of the turnouts on the network were fully protected by ATP, with most turnouts dependent on more traditional lineside signals.

ONRSR’s primary focus necessarily needed to be on the “here and now” of managing risks to safety SFAIRP until the longer-term strategy was delivered. Additionally, if not fully funded, more immediate action would be required to address the risk to safety posed by the overspeed incidents. As such an Improvement Notice was issued, that required Sydney Trains to review the present-day risk of overspeed incidents at unprotected turnouts and ensure that it was being managed SFAIRP.

Under the terms of the Improvement Notice, ONRSR oversaw Sydney Trains’ work as it considered the full range of risk controls available, placing a particular emphasis on engineering controls. ONRSR also required a documented plan that included a timeframe for implementation and directed the operator to make a case to TfNSW where additional funding would be required.

Safety Improvement Outcomes

To date, Sydney Trains has delivered against the requirements of the Improvement Notice and the plan it submitted in response. Critically Sydney Trains has comprehensively identified and prioritised those unprotected turnouts and developed a tiered engineering approach to addressing them - based on locations with the greatest speed differential between the turnouts and the mainline. Most significantly, this has resulted in temporary speed restrictions being imposed at the highest risk turnout locations across the network. Elsewhere ONRSR has noted improvements to Sydney Trains’ speed compliance monitoring, its analysis and governance (reporting) processes, and the development of a driver awareness program to educate on the locations of unprotected turnouts.

Through these initiatives and the continued advocacy by ONRSR at senior government levels, preliminary work has commenced on a High-Risk Turn Out (HRTO) Program, with a business case presented to TfNSW to support its full implementation. Along with delivery of DSP Tranches 1 and 2 and the HRTO program in the short term, the longer-term vision remains the introduction of ECTS Level 2 across the entire electrified Sydney network.

ONRSR’s General Manager, Operations in Sydney, Dane Newton, said his team along with other subject matter experts within ONRSR would continue to monitor the status of Sydney Trains’ interim control measures and the HRTO program.

“This is a great example of how we’re making a difference out there to improve safety. We’ve got ONRSR’s operations team working with our accreditation team, working with our safety strategy team to escalate matters, and it’s the whole organisation pulling together to really drive safety improvement,” he said.

“It’s a good news story, not just for us but for Sydney Trains and the travelling public. Now we just need to see the plans come to fruition.”

ONRSR Chief Executive and National Rail Safety Regulator, Dr Natalie Pelham said the work with Sydney Trains had application across the country and was already influencing safety priorities and decisions in other jurisdictions.

“It’s a great project and example of the collaborative work we do to improve rail safety,” she said.

“We have other projects like this where collaboration between ONRSR and rail operators is helping to drive changes across the network. It’s an approach we are encouraging, to identify more opportunities to support operators to make safety improvements happen.”