Code of Practice: Train Visibility at Level Crossings – Tourist and Heritage Case Study

Heritage Rail Museum Inc (HRMI)

Heritage Rail Museum Inc (HRMI) is a fictional medium-sized tourist and heritage rail transport operator. As an accredited rolling stock operator, HRMI manages a fleet of diverse heritage rolling stock including railmotors, steam and diesel locomotives and passenger carriages.

HRMI is also accredited as a rail infrastructure manager for 7 km of rail infrastructure which connects to a major government-owned suburban passenger rail network.

From time to time, HRMI operates charter services on the suburban passenger rail network, as well as operating a low-speed service on its own track using various types of rolling stock that it owns.

HRMI’s committee was considering the implementation of the Code of Practice: Train Visibility at Level Crossings (code) and how it will be applied to its diverse operations. The committee intended to develop an implementation plan to ensure compliance with the code.

Following consultation with its members, the committee decided a one-size-fits-all approach was not appropriate and that each part of its operations and their specific characteristics needed to be assessed. The process for assessing each part was the same, as follows:

• Fully describe the scope of the operations and identify what aspects are relevant to the code – level crossing protection controls, traffic control devices, lines of sight and train conspicuity.

• Assess the risks associated with the operations, considering the hazards identified in the code.

• Consider the controls identified in the code and decide if and how the controls will be implemented.

• Document the outcomes from the risk assessments, the controls that will be implemented and reasons why it is not reasonable to implement other controls identified in the code.

• Identify where to use any additional controls beyond what is specified in the code to manage risks to train visibility so far as is reasonably practicable.

• Liaise with other rail transport operators and road managers to implement controls and any treatments to manage risks.

• Develop an action plan and timeframes to implement new controls and changes for each operation. This would include training for rail safety workers on why the changes are important
  
• Monitor and review the implementation of the changes to ensure they have been effective.

The outcome of this process resulted in HRMI taking different approaches for different parts of its operations. Appendix A to the Code of Practice provides an overview of a risk management framework at level crossings.

Rail Infrastructure Manager

As a rail infrastructure manager, HRMI is focused on the protection at the five level crossings on its network and sighting along the rail corridor. HRMI undertook the following risk assessment process:

• Identified level crossings on its network – the code focuses on train visibility at public road level crossings, but the same process can be applied for private road level crossings.

• Undertook a full review of the risks associated with each level crossing using updated traffic data and onsite assessments to evaluate compliance with the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices – Railway Crossings (MUTCD). These assessments included the relevant road manager.

In addition, and in line with the requirements of the code, HRMI and the road manager ensured:

• Traffic control devices, including any advanced warning devices, are visible and maintained.

HRMI and the road manager considered the curvature of the road, any vandalism to the traffic control devices, vegetation in the rail corridor, time of day and weather condition impacts on visibility – for example, sun glare, dust or fog. They also considered the perspective of different types of road users – heavy vehicles, cars and pedestrians.

• Sight lines are established and maintained to enable visibility of traffic control devices and approaching trains.

Note: HRMI and the road manager considered road traffic types and volumes that may impact the road user’s ability to view across traffic lanes, the road approach angles, obstructions from structures and other things on private property, and sighting to the departure side of the level crossing which might lead to uncertainty that a driver can safely clear a crossing.

HRMI and the road manager reviewed the interface agreements to ensure level crossing controls and responsibilities for improvements and maintenance are clearly articulated and documented.

A review of heavy vehicle routes will also be conducted by the road manager to ensure the level crossings are considered in the route assessments.

Actions to comply with the code

The following actions will be implemented:

• On the level crossings that have active protection, all lights will be upgraded to LED lights to improve visibility.

• While not currently required, funding will be sought to upgrade one crossing to include boom gates to cater for projected future road use (upgraded road and expected increase in road traffic volume).

• Vegetation that obscures vision will be permanently removed.

• One passive crossing will have the original timber crossing gates reinstalled as an additional control.

Note: This control was seen as a low cost and historically appropriate option for increasing the protection at a crossing located next to the museum station which partially obscures the road user’s vision. New operating procedures will ensure no trains cross the crossing until the gates have been closed by the station staff or the train crew.

HRMI documents the outcomes of the risk assessment in detail in its safety management system, including the identified controls. The controls that are not used, and the rationale for not using them are also documented.

HRMI updates its level crossing interface agreements as needed in collaboration with the road manager.

Mainline rolling stock operator

As a mainline rolling stock operator, HRMI will focus on better visibility of trains through illumination and conspicuity. HRMI and the mainline manager considered:

• the lighting of the train, including both locomotives and train consist

• the contrast between the head of the train and the landscape

• the cleanliness of the train

• time of day impacts on the visibility and contrast of the train, including sun glare

• the angle between the road and the rail and whether a vehicle’s headlights will illuminate the train

• the impact of weather including dust, fog and rain

• the contrast between the train and the background environment.

HRMI considered if the use of additional lighting or other relevant rolling stock-based risk controls are needed to minimise the risk of collision. Specifically, HRMI considered:

• the application of Australian Standard 7531, including in relation to lighting, livery, reflectivity, cleanliness

• the use of beacon and side marker lights to increase conspicuity at night, at wide view angles and in misty weather conditions

• the use of front beacon lights to increase conspicuity when headlights must be on low beam.
  

Actions to comply with the code

HRMI identified the following actions to improve train conspicuity:

• All locomotives and railmotors that operate on the main line will have lighting upgraded to meet the requirements of the code and Australian Standard 7531. This will include the use of LED bulbs and addition of marker or ditch lights using modified removeable lamps that do not compromise the historical look of the locomotives.

• All passenger carriages operating on the main line will have internal lighting upgraded to modern LED lights to increase the luminosity of the lighting and visibility from outside of the carriage.
  At all times the carriages are operated at night, regardless of whether passengers are present, the interior lights must be on, and sunshades must be up. This is an alternative to fitting reflective delineators.

• The livery of two mainline locomotives will be changed to improve conspicuity. While the change improves the visibility of the locomotives, the chosen liveries are still historically correct and of an era that reflects the aims of the museum.

• Rolling stock upgrades are planned to be completed before December 2029 to comply with the code.

HRMI’s assessment concluded that:

• Additional beacon lights were not required.

• The railmotor’s livery complies with the code.

• The livery of mainline steam locomotives will not be changed. Using a risk-based approach, HRMI determined that a change to livery is not reasonably practicable as it has been determined any change will have a negative impact on ticket sales and the ability to retain volunteers.

• The assessment also considered the likelihood of a collision on the suburban passenger rail network given all crossing are protected with flashing lights and boom arms and the low number of operations compared to commercial services. HRMI documented this decision, including the reasons for not applying the code.
  

Branch line rolling stock operator

As a branch line rolling stock operator, HRMI undertook the same risk assessment described above for its mainline operations. The outcome of this risk assessment was different for its branch line operations. HRMI identified alternative means of eliminating or managing risks so far is as reasonably practicable to those required to be considered in the code.

The risk controls identified by HRMI include:

• Some historically significant steam locomotives and passenger carriages will be restricted to daylight and branch line operations only.
  The decision allows this rolling stock to be maintained as close to its original design, as the rolling stock attracts significant interest from the public and volunteers, and modifications are not reasonable considering the restricted use and likelihood of a collision.

• While no upgrades will be made to the lighting systems or liveries, the locomotives are restricted to 10 km/h over all level crossings. Road traffic controllers must be used on one crossing until the crossing can be upgraded to include manually operated crossing gates.

• Using a risk-based approach and informed by the use of the five level crossings (road user behaviour and visibility), HRMI determined that compliance with Australian Standard 7531 is not reasonably practicable as the likelihood of collision is very low and changes to livery will have a negative impact on ticket sales and the ability to retain volunteers.

• HRMI documented this decision, including the reasons for not applying the risk controls identified in the code.

In developing its response to the code, HRMI can clearly demonstrate how it has applied the code to its unique operations.

Importantly, HRMI developed a clear action plan to be implemented in stages over five years to ensure the resources required are secured and available, and the work is not left to the last minute.

Further information

Read the Code of Practice: Train Visibility at Level Crossings on the ONRSR website.

The website contains additional information which may assist rail infrastructure managers, rolling stock operators and road managers in undertaking risk assessments at level crossings:

• Fact sheet - Interface Agreements

• Fact sheet - Interface Agreements – Information for Road Managers

• Template for interface agreement

• Guideline - Using the template interface agreement for rail or road crossings